Lessons from the British withdrawal from Iraq

As the Brits prepare to withdraw from Iraq later this year, they are having to face one of the least talked about problems resultant from our occupation of Iraq. Once we leave, what happens to those Iraqis who worked with the coalition as a means of helping their own country? For all intents and purposes, they are seen by other Iraqis, particularly those belonging to militias and insurgent groups as collaborators and traitors to the Iraqi state, and their respective religious/tribal grouping. Once we leave, they are as good as dead. Indeed, some already have been killed, gruesomely.

Britain has come under increased criticism, including from the Iraqi government for its seeming willingness to abandon these Iraqis to their fate. That of course, speaks volumes about the British failure in southern Iraq as well as of its poor preparation in planning its withdrawal. Part of the reason this question has to be contemplated is that as Britain withdraws, it is becoming clear that far from leaving a stable southern region, it will be leaving a volatile and violent one where different Shiite militias are beginning to battle for supremacy and control over territory and the lucrative opium trade.

As a result of the outcry against Britain's limited asylum policy toward Iraqis who aided them in Iraq, Prime Minister Brown has ordered a review of his government's policy. According to some figures, up to 20,000 Iraqis worked for British troops since 2003, but only 600 are currently employed now. This means that if Britain were to grant asylum to its Iraqi employees, at a minimum it would have to grant 600 applications to employees and their families. This without mentioning what Britain may have to do for the families of its Iraqi employees that have already been killed, and who know are also targets for retribution. According to the article, Denmark provides a better example of how to handle this issue. They "airlifted interpreters and their families – a total of 200 people – out of the country when its soldiers withdrew last month."

As mentioned above, even the Iraqi government is pushing for Britain to address the problem of helping those who aided Britain to get out of the country. This a seeming acknowledgment of the Iraqi government's growing inability to handle the security of their own population, even in the southern part of the country.

At the same time, the British are also confronting another issue we will likely need to confront as we withdraw from Iraq. General Sir Michael Rose, told the independent that "We have not enough troops there to make any impact. We have to decide whether the risks and the losses we are suffering are worth it." Put another way, how do we withdraw to ensure that as we move troops out of the country, we don't end up in a situation where the troops left behind are not at greater risk of being killed because they have not the personnel or fire-power to ensure their safety. This is brought to bear in the Independent's article as they tell us that as troop numbers have been reduced, casualties have increased. This paragraph gives us a stark picture of what type of withdrawal the Brits are now confronting, and perhaps a glimpse of our own:

At the beginning of the year, Britain had just over 7,000 troops in two provinces in south-east Iraq. Now, following the handover of security in Maysan province and bases in Basra city to the Iraqis, the remaining force of 5,500 is confined to just two: the contingency operating base at Basra airport and a battle group of 500 at Basra Palace, which is to all intents and purposes under siege. The British contingent is expected to decline to 5,000 once Basra Palace is turned over to Iraqi forces this summer, leaving the airport base, increasingly under attack, as the only British outpost in Iraq.

The situation has deteriorated to such a point, that Generals (it is unclear if these are former or current generals from the article) are openly questioning whether Britain will have to "consider some kind of fighting withdrawal."

As someone who has at times advocated a full-withdrawal (mostly in exasperation at this administration's incompetence), these are some of the same questions that have troubled me. For anyone, particularly our current Presidential contenders advocating withdrawal from Iraq (rapid or otherwise) this are some of the main issues we will have to deal with to ensure not only a safe withdrawal for out troops, but also a means to aid those Iraqis who risked, and continue to risk their lives to help us and their country.

The examples and argument above, to reiterate, are not meant as arguments against withdrawing, but rather as constructive criticisms for the issues we need to address if we so choose to withdraw from Iraq. As most of you know, I've moved over time in favor of a Biden-Gelb like approach where we first move to quell or at least reduce the violence, before moving to a complete withdrawal. For me, that plan is one of the few that seeks a way to address the sources of violence in the country, while also looking for an exit strategy for American troops. The issues, however, are important because we already made the mistake of going into a war without much thought to how to handle the post-war phase of the campaign despite knowing the issues we would likely face.

It is now incumbent on us to plan our withdrawal from Iraq, better informed by the British experience to ensure that we avoid the pitfalls to which they have fallen prey. Otherwise, we risk repeating this administration's biggest mistake of forgetting lessons learned, and dismissing any information which did not accord with their stated policy and that would be a disservice not only to ourselves, and the soldiers currently risking their lives on a daily basis, but also to our country and those who have paid the ultimate price for, among other things, the mismanagement of this war.