Update on the Mediterranean Union

I'm back. Sorry for the lack of posts these past few months, but I have been busy with other matters. I think what's left of this month will be partially about catching up with events that have transpired since I last posted. As such, this post is intended to update you on President Sarkozy's plan for a Mediterranean Union. I wrote two posts on the subject last year, which can be found here, and here. Both focused on the pros and cons of such a proposal, as well as the prospects it had of coming to fruition.

On the European side, many countries had problems with the proposal from the very beginning. Chancellor Merkel opposed it, first, because it did not include every EU member, particularly Germany, who would have to pay for such a plan without having much say in how the money was spent; second, because the project seemed redundant since the EU already had what was then known as the Barcelona Process which focused on strengthening EU ties to the Mediterranean, including Israel and Turkey; and thirdly, because Germany, in particular, saw it as a move that risked creating a powerful regional bloc within the EU, with France at its helm. Other European nations, such as Great Britain opposed Sarkozy's plan because they saw it as an attempt by France's President to prevent Turkey’s ascension into the EU, by providing it with an alternate club to join. Spain meanwhile was one of the few who supported the proposal because it saw the Mediterranean Union as an extension of the Barcelona Process. Turkey warily supported the proposal, but expressed similar concerns as those voiced by Great Britain. The Czech Republic and Poland opposed the Union initially because they saw it as merely an aggrandizement project for France’s President, whose country takes over the EU presidency on July 1 of this year. Now that the Union for the Mediterranean is about to become a reality, these countries are calling for the EU to focus more on eastern European states, such as Ukraine. In fact, they are calling for a process modeled on the Union for the Mediterranean to foster closer ties to eastern European countries not yet part of the EU.

In the Maghreb and the Middle East several countries (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Israel) expressed varying degrees of support for such a venture. However, there was enough support for it, that many have begun complaining that rather than focusing on their own regional, read non-European institutions, most Arab and Maghrebi countries seem intent on joining the EU sponsored UM. Mohammad El-Ashab argued recently in Al-Hayat that North African countries should have used the Arab Maghreb Union as a platform to reinforce their position in negotiating with Europe. Instead, they seemingly have abandoned that Union and have sought to replace it with the EU sponsored UM, leaving the EU free to set the agenda, based on its interests, and not those of North African countries.

Since it was proposed, the UM has been debated in European capitals, but particularly between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, and earlier this month, they reached a compromise of sorts. Now, almost a year after it was proposed, the Union for the Mediterranean is about to become a reality, on July 13, 2008, but the new proposal agreed upon will retain little of its original design, and come closer to the Spanish vision described above. Chancellor Merkel threatened a boycott of a summit in Paris if President Sarkozy did not water down his proposal. After much debate, Sarkozy gave in. Now, his proposed Union will not only be an extension of the Barcelona Process, but will also include all members of the EU, and not just those bordering the Mediterranean Sea. To boot, the full name adopted for it is “The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.” Germany has also been firm in its demand that no new money be allocated for the project, other than what has already been allocated for the 2007-2013 period, which currently stands at €16 billion. Sarkozy, for his part, has promised to raise an additional €14 billion for the Union from private sources, including the government of Qatar.

To be sure, the actual shape that the Union for the Mediterranean will take, will not be known until after the July 13-14 summit announcing its creation, but what is clear is that it won’t be the same grand scheme proposed by President Sarkozy last year. As mentioned above, thanks to the Franco-German agreement, the UM will no longer be independent of EU instruments, since it now is an extension of the Barcelona Process, including its parliamentary component, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Neighborhood Process. Moreover, the Union for the Mediterranean has been downgraded from the international forum, as envisioned by Sarkozy, to a mere summit of EU and Mediterranean countries.

As if this was not enough, the new UM will have to deal with thorny issues from the start, including the very difficult and complicated relationship between many of its member states, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many countries will likely want to avoid having the rotating co-presidency of the UM going to Israel), the Syrian-Lebanese situation (particularly Syria’s association agreement with the EU which has been frozen since 2005 following the assassination of Rafik Hariri) and tensions between Morocco and Algeria. This, without adding the increasing violence and threat posed to North Africa and Southern Europe by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This, while also dealing with far more countries than Sarkozy had envisioned participating, leading many to wonder whether his greatest fear has come true, that there would be so many participants that nothing would ever get done, and hence, the Union despite coming online in July, will for all intent and purpose be dead in the water.

Additionally, some argue that the UM seems to be too geared toward business ventures, with too little focus given to democracy promotion or political reform. As such, it has come under increasing criticism by human rights activists. However, I think such a criticism misses the larger point. As Tom Barnett has argued for some time now, one of the best ways to promote political reform is to first connect a country’s or region’s economy to globalization, allowing through that process the flow of international rule sets, which although primarily geared toward business dealings, in the long run, open the way for political change. Still, it remains to be seen exactly how the Union for the Mediterranean will be configured, and whether it can overcome the challenges that essentially killed the Barcelona Process the first time around, to address issues such as immigration, terrorism, further develop economic and trade relations among its participants while also promoting some measures of good governance and likely environmental protection.