Is armed humanitarian intervention the answer in Burma?

The blogosphere is fired up by the notion of using force to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Burma/Myanmar. However, is that the right course of action? Notable blogs such as The Duck of Minerva, Hidden Unities and Coming Anarchy have recently posted items discussing this subject. They're not the only ones, over at the Washington Post, Fred Hiatt argues forcefully for the international community to keep the promise made at the UN's 60th anniversary, to "intervene, forcefully if necessary, if a state failed to protect its own people." Anne Applebaum, at Slate makes an equally strong case to use force to deliver aid to the thousands of Burmese affected by this catastrophe. To boot, Robert Kaplan has provided a blue-print for how to do this militarily, even as he also argues for us to hold a realistic view of the dangers involved, echoing former Secretary of State Colin Powell's Pottery Barn rule, "we break it, we own it". Even the French government, through its Foreign Minister, Bernard Koucher, has called for a military humanitarian intervention in this case (The European Commission rejected his proposal). One of the few voices arguing against embarking on such an endeavor is Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye, who questions the premises on which such calls are based, as well as the slippery slope they lead us to, if we are truly to follow the path of military humanitarianism.

Peter at the Duck of Minerva focuses on what factors lead to a possible American intervention, or what would make Burma part of the Axis of Evil. In Burma, the US is not really interested in its natural resources, and though the generals in charge are horrible thugs, they generally keep to themselves, and do not seek to shake the international order, so American interests are not really at stake. In his words:

Moral of the story: if you’re evil, we’ll go to the mattress to take care of business. If you’re just plain bad, you’re probably in the clear.

To be sure, Peter, like most commentators, recognizes that part of the reason behind the military junta's intransigence has more to do with what they see as the danger of allowing international aid; a challenge to their legitimacy. Here, think of how the Bush administration's handling of Katrina led to his losing the trust and support of the majority of the population in the United States. In an authoritarian dictatorship, the loss would be even more crippling as they already have problems with legitimacy to begin with, and far worst than just a disputed election.

Eddie at Hidden Unities argues that given that "the credibility of the international human rights regime and the concept of 'responsibility to protect' is an at all time low, this catastrophe presents an opportunity to rehabilitate it. Not only that, but it would also help rehabilitate the value of "coalitions of the willing" which any action would have to be, given the fact that both Russia and China would veto any action through the UN Security Council. Still, he argues that these countries, along with India, Singapore and Thailand could be embarrassed into participating in one way or another, since the threat of force by a large coalition would force them to pressure the junta a lot more to accept international aid. He ends by arguing that "the concept of waging personal war against dictators and tyrants is one that should be further explored by governments and interested groups." This is in line with Thomas Barnett's theory, which calls for taking out those regimes which are so devoid of being rehabilitated, examples of which he cites as North Korea, and Zimbabwe. Eddie, argues that given the current reality, Myanmar's (Burma's) military junta is a good candidate. Eddie, however, does not argue for bringing democracy to the country, but suggests that even a junta controlled by Beijing, but which is actually competent would be preferable to the status quo.

Applebaum and Kaplan essentially make the same argument, that given the current situation the lesser of the two evils is to intervene with force, not necessarily to topple the military junta, but to deliver aid to the areas where it is needed. Kaplan even suggests that the US navy, which currently is holding exercises in Thailand, could enter the Irrawaddy Delta delivering aid from ships, with a small military footprint on the shore to reduce the likelihood of a military engagement with the military of Myanmar/Burma. Following this, Kaplan rightly recognizes that such an operation may hasten the collapse of the country's government, leaving the US and the international community dealing with not only a humanitarian crisis, but also a country which has historically led with various insurgent movements by various minority ethnic groups fighting against largely Burman controlled governments. Kaplan ends his piece by stating:

It seems like a simple moral decision: help the survivors of the cyclone...Sending in marines and sailors is the easy part; but make no mistake, the very act of our invasion could land us with the responsibility for fixing Burma afterward.

Indeed, as noted above, many of these bloggers, pundits and government officials base their arguments on the UN recognized R2P or Responsibility to Protect, which was adopted in 2005 partly due to remorse for the shortcomings exposed in the international community's failure to act during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990's.

The case is made even stronger by what Applebaum's argues is the Junta's overriding objective, its survival, at the cost of that of its own people. The crisis and number of dead so far, 60,000+, is only surpassed by the North Korean famine of 1995, which claimed the lives of as many as 3 million people. What makes matters worst is that according to recent news reports, not only is the military junta insisting that all aid go through the military, but also the fact that many aid groups are now complaining that the junta is in fact stealing aid meant for the victims, diverting it or warehousing it and not allowing it to reach those in need. As if all of this was not enough, to make you want to support forceful action, the economist reported last year that both Pyongyang and Russia were helping the military junta in Myanmar/Burma, in setting up a 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor in the country.

On the other side, it seems clear that the military junta is paranoid when it comes to outsiders, and it truly believes that any attempt to deliver aid using military vessels, such as has been suggested by Kaplan and others, is actually seen as a foreign invasion, and an attempt to topple the government. Hence, the voices calling for such action, rather than helping to build the trust of the junta, may actually be increasing their fears, and hence fueling their intransigence. This of course, is premised on them having ready access to the internet, particularly online papers such as the Washington Post, or the New York Times, if not other international media which no doubt have reported on these grumblings.

Dave Schuler, has a pretty good argument against intervening. Rather than summarizing it, I'll place a snippent here for your reference. To read the rest, please visit his site. Dave argues as follows

What argument can be made for coercive humanitarian aid in Burma that couldn’t have been made 20 years ago?

Is it the scale of the calamity? Following that logic we should have invaded China a dozen times over. Over the period of the last 60 years the Chinese government has killed a number of its own citizens greater than the total population of Burma. As had the Soviet Union.

Is it the lack of willingness of the ruling junta to accept aid? On that basis any number of governments including our own would justify invasion.

...Bad things happen. Our hearts go out to those who are suffering. The purpose of our military is to defend our country and its interests seen in a fairly narrow sense.

Must we go abroad in search of monsters to destroy? Where does it end?

Indeed, if we intervene in Burma/Myanmar, based on any of the factors mentioned above, it does open the door to other types of intervention that would further undermine the principle of state sovereignty, something which given most of the third worlds history of colonialism, many are loathe to support. This is part of what explains South Africa's opposition to the violation of state sovereignty, be it in Burma/Myanmar or Zimbabwe. To be sure, economic interests play a huge role as both India and China want to enlarge ports in Burma/Myanmar to increase their access to its oil wealth. This while Thailand wants to tap its lumber industry and Singapore wants to continue providing for its banking needs.

The US, and those members of the international community that care about this, can indeed put pressure on the regime through attacking their bank accounts, as Eddie suggested, or even waving the possibility of trial and judgment by the ICC for crimes against humanity. However, what is exposed in all this is the lack of a mechanism for processing failed states. Tom Barnett has written extensively on this at his blog and in Blueprint for Action and summarized here courtesy of the SecondLife Future Salon blog.

China, India and Russia would have to be part of this system, it cannot work without them, but before they can accept it, they need to be sold on its need and the opportunities it presents.

However, that is something to address at the theoretical level. In Burma, Myanmar the suffering now is real. It remains to be seen, how the recent earthquake in China will affect its posture vis a vis Burma. After all, if China's nationals have the right to expect that their government will do everything it can to bring aid to them following such a catastrophe, why shouldn't the Burmese people have the right to expect the same from their own government, or the international community?

For now, the international community continues to beg the military junta in Myanmar/Burma to allow more international aid in, and so far that is all its limited to. Meanwhile, the Burmese population continues to wait, for aid that may never come, and if it does, may come too late.

So what is the answer to the question in the title of this post? As a neo-Barnettist, I can get behind the push for an armed humanitarian intervention, but only if we can have more players (like France, China and India) to help us carry the load, and with the caveat that we work toward creating a regime for dealing with these failed states in the future. Still, as Dave Schuler argues, we also need to address the very real problems that such an intervention would create, in terms of how we deal with the implications of our actions. After all, the US is stretched thin as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can ill afford to get caught in another low-intensity conflict, particularly with China on the opposing end. Watching the suffering, it's hard not to be for intervening, and fast, but as they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Other links of interest

Security Dilemmas: To Send Aid Or Not To Send Aid, That Is The Question

Looks at how aid allows the junta to remain in power, hence the question of whether or not to send aid.

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Update on the Mediterranean Union

I'm back. Sorry for the lack of posts these past few months, but I have been busy with other matters. I think what's left of this month will be partially about catching up with events that have transpired since I last posted. As such, this post is intended to update you on President Sarkozy's plan for a Mediterranean Union. I wrote two posts on the subject last year, which can be found here, and here. Both focused on the pros and cons of such a proposal, as well as the prospects it had of coming to fruition.

On the European side, many countries had problems with the proposal from the very beginning. Chancellor Merkel opposed it, first, because it did not include every EU member, particularly Germany, who would have to pay for such a plan without having much say in how the money was spent; second, because the project seemed redundant since the EU already had what was then known as the Barcelona Process which focused on strengthening EU ties to the Mediterranean, including Israel and Turkey; and thirdly, because Germany, in particular, saw it as a move that risked creating a powerful regional bloc within the EU, with France at its helm. Other European nations, such as Great Britain opposed Sarkozy's plan because they saw it as an attempt by France's President to prevent Turkey’s ascension into the EU, by providing it with an alternate club to join. Spain meanwhile was one of the few who supported the proposal because it saw the Mediterranean Union as an extension of the Barcelona Process. Turkey warily supported the proposal, but expressed similar concerns as those voiced by Great Britain. The Czech Republic and Poland opposed the Union initially because they saw it as merely an aggrandizement project for France’s President, whose country takes over the EU presidency on July 1 of this year. Now that the Union for the Mediterranean is about to become a reality, these countries are calling for the EU to focus more on eastern European states, such as Ukraine. In fact, they are calling for a process modeled on the Union for the Mediterranean to foster closer ties to eastern European countries not yet part of the EU.

In the Maghreb and the Middle East several countries (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Israel) expressed varying degrees of support for such a venture. However, there was enough support for it, that many have begun complaining that rather than focusing on their own regional, read non-European institutions, most Arab and Maghrebi countries seem intent on joining the EU sponsored UM. Mohammad El-Ashab argued recently in Al-Hayat that North African countries should have used the Arab Maghreb Union as a platform to reinforce their position in negotiating with Europe. Instead, they seemingly have abandoned that Union and have sought to replace it with the EU sponsored UM, leaving the EU free to set the agenda, based on its interests, and not those of North African countries.

Since it was proposed, the UM has been debated in European capitals, but particularly between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, and earlier this month, they reached a compromise of sorts. Now, almost a year after it was proposed, the Union for the Mediterranean is about to become a reality, on July 13, 2008, but the new proposal agreed upon will retain little of its original design, and come closer to the Spanish vision described above. Chancellor Merkel threatened a boycott of a summit in Paris if President Sarkozy did not water down his proposal. After much debate, Sarkozy gave in. Now, his proposed Union will not only be an extension of the Barcelona Process, but will also include all members of the EU, and not just those bordering the Mediterranean Sea. To boot, the full name adopted for it is “The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.” Germany has also been firm in its demand that no new money be allocated for the project, other than what has already been allocated for the 2007-2013 period, which currently stands at €16 billion. Sarkozy, for his part, has promised to raise an additional €14 billion for the Union from private sources, including the government of Qatar.

To be sure, the actual shape that the Union for the Mediterranean will take, will not be known until after the July 13-14 summit announcing its creation, but what is clear is that it won’t be the same grand scheme proposed by President Sarkozy last year. As mentioned above, thanks to the Franco-German agreement, the UM will no longer be independent of EU instruments, since it now is an extension of the Barcelona Process, including its parliamentary component, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Neighborhood Process. Moreover, the Union for the Mediterranean has been downgraded from the international forum, as envisioned by Sarkozy, to a mere summit of EU and Mediterranean countries.

As if this was not enough, the new UM will have to deal with thorny issues from the start, including the very difficult and complicated relationship between many of its member states, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many countries will likely want to avoid having the rotating co-presidency of the UM going to Israel), the Syrian-Lebanese situation (particularly Syria’s association agreement with the EU which has been frozen since 2005 following the assassination of Rafik Hariri) and tensions between Morocco and Algeria. This, without adding the increasing violence and threat posed to North Africa and Southern Europe by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This, while also dealing with far more countries than Sarkozy had envisioned participating, leading many to wonder whether his greatest fear has come true, that there would be so many participants that nothing would ever get done, and hence, the Union despite coming online in July, will for all intent and purpose be dead in the water.

Additionally, some argue that the UM seems to be too geared toward business ventures, with too little focus given to democracy promotion or political reform. As such, it has come under increasing criticism by human rights activists. However, I think such a criticism misses the larger point. As Tom Barnett has argued for some time now, one of the best ways to promote political reform is to first connect a country’s or region’s economy to globalization, allowing through that process the flow of international rule sets, which although primarily geared toward business dealings, in the long run, open the way for political change. Still, it remains to be seen exactly how the Union for the Mediterranean will be configured, and whether it can overcome the challenges that essentially killed the Barcelona Process the first time around, to address issues such as immigration, terrorism, further develop economic and trade relations among its participants while also promoting some measures of good governance and likely environmental protection.

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On the State of the Union speech

In this post, I won't focus too much on the President's domestic agenda. Instead, I just want to highlight a few items he mentioned in his State of the Union address with regard to foreign affairs, which I consider important.

One of the most important policy initiatives the President mentioned was Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance, which he mentioned right after asking Congress to pass the Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea. The FTA's are important, particularly as the US tries to stem the tide against Hugo Chavez' Bolivarian Revolution, which has spread from Venezuela to Bolivia, Ecuador and to a lesser extent Nicaragua. To be fair, there are many issues within these countries that have aided Chavismo in its pursuit, but Colombia, and Mexico have served to a large extent as bulwarks against Chavez' influence. Passing the FTA with Colombia rewards a strong ally, and one who has also taken on extremely difficult issues within his own country; issues that have cost him politically, both in stature, but also in political allies who have been forced to resign from his government for their ties to right-wing military groups accused of egregious human rights violations. These issues, however, would be better explored in a post solely dedicated to Colombia.

With regard to South Korea, the FTA is much warranted, as that country has seen much of its investment flowing to China to take advantage of the opportunities that the Chinese juggernaut presents. Opening markets, preferentially to South Korea would aid them in attracting more FDI as China, among others try to take advantage of the opportunities the FTA provides for South Korean exporters. It would also likely make South Korea a bit more cooperative on the issue of North Korea's nuclear disarmament, which is likely to be a very important issue as a new president takes office come next January.

Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance would make the passage of these FTAs easier, as it would address at least one aspect of concern for members of Congress who are less than enthusiastic about passing another FTA, for fear of the job losses the US is likely to incur as a result. The program, if funded, can help Americans so affected by providing with among other things, rapid response assistance, reemployment services, job search allowances, relocation allowances, training and income support. I suspect that even this may not be enough to get these FTAs passed through Congress, as there is much anti-Free Trade sentiment there nowadays, mostly due to out current economic woes.

Perhaps the most important policy initiative put forth by the President in this State of the Union, one Tom Barnett has repeatedly and forcefully argued for, is that of purchasing food aid, not from American farmers, but rather from local farmers in the countries to which the aid is going. In this way, we not only provide famine stricken areas with food aid, but also jump start their local economies thereby reconnecting them, ever so slightly to the global market. It was unclear from the president's statement, whether the food aid would be purchased from farmers in the specific country we are trying to help, or from the third world in general. The distinction is important as purchasing food aid from emerging agricultural power houses would aid these in achieving first world status. This policy proposal will now doubt be fought tooth and nail by our agricultural lobby, and powerful congressmen such as Tom Lantos, who have opposed such initiatives in the past. However, if there's a proposal specifically designed to shrink the Gap, and truly focus our development aid (and humanitarian aid) where it is most needed, this is it. The President being a lame duck at this point is unlikely to gain much traction on this issue, but it is at least noteworthy that he mentioned it.

The President also seemed to bring to the fore a new "Axis of Despotism(?)," by naming Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus and Burma, at least three if which don't get much time in the American press, as countries where the US supports freedom. However, it is unlikely that any new initiatives will pass during the next 11 months that would seek to implement any policy with regard to these states. That may be a good thing, since given the changing political dynamic within Cuba, at least, the worst thing we could do is give the new leadership an excuse to close themselves further, or to rally nationalist sentiment against the US. The least we intervene in Cuba, the more they have to focus on their internal problems, as Iran has demonstrated to some extent following the lowering of tensions between the US and Iran. Of course, the President, seemingly failing to heed the message, directed some of his comments to Iran, something that can only help Ahmedinejad in rallying conservatives and nationalists to his side once again; people who have seemingly abandoned him as of late, due to his incompetence and mismanagement of the Iranian economy (among them, Ayatollah Khamenei). As others will likely note, asking Iran to give up its Ace before sitting at the negotiating table, will not happen. It's nuclear program is leverage, without which it knows it can't get what it wants. This however, is also a subject best tackled in its own post as it is too complicated to flesh out in a paragraph.

One of the few points where I disagreed with the President was on this overtly broad statement:

In the past seven years, we've also seen the images that have sobered us. We've watched throngs of mourners in Lebanon and Pakistan carrying the caskets of beloved leaders taken by the assassins' hands.

We've seen wedding guests in blood-soaked finery staggering from a hotel in Jordan, Afghans and Iraqis blown up in mosques and markets, and trains in London and Madrid ripped apart by bombs

We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear.

....that is why the terrorists are fighting to deny this choice to the people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Palestinian territories.

I don't much disagee that we are indeed fighting terrorists in some of these places, my problem, rather is from his using the "terrorists" to describe them all, lumping separate conflicts under one banner while also seeming to tie them to al Qaeda. In Lebanon, the major is not against al Qaeda, but rather against Iran and Syria's attempt to increase their influence in the country and aid their quasi-proxy, Hezbollah. That conflict is intimately tied to Iran's rise and the reshaping geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, in what Vali Nasr has termed the Shia Revival. Being Shiites, or secularists in the case of Syria, these countries see al Qaeda as enemies, not allies. To boot, Iran helped us during the Afghan campaign because al Qaeda, being a Sunni fundamentalist entity and ideology sees Shiites as worst than even the infidel West.

Iraq, for the most part, has become part of that struggle, with Sunnis seeking a better contract than the one they were presented with following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. It is also a conflict between and among Shiites, who have differing visions of the future of Iraq. It also involves the Kurds and their own dreams for self-actualization, and the security interests of Turkey, Iran and Syria, all of which have a substantial minority Kurdish population. Al Qaeda in Iraq, is but a minor player, powerful to be sure, but surrounded by enemies on all sides, including now, the Sunnis who have chosen to side with the US against their one time ally.

The Palestinian territories have more to do with Israels right to security and Palestinian's valid claims for nationhood. Most of the violence there centers on intra-Palestinian issues that have little, if nothing, to do with our GWOT against al Qaeda.

In fact, of all these, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have major problems with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and hence, the terrorists who attacked on us on September 11, 2001. Even here, however, there are deeper issues centered on Pakistan's need for a friendlier, neutral government in Afghanistan so as to avoid the prospect of a two front war, if it were to start one with India. So long as we don't address some of Pakistan's security needs in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they will do much to stamp out the Taliban, or al Qaeda, as they would see these (particularly the Taliban) as a means of retaining influence in Afghanistan. In lumping all of these different conflicts together under the moniker of terrorism, the President makes it seem as if they are all related to the main fight against al Qaeda. They are important, to be sure, but thinking of them solely in terms of al Qaeda or the GWOT obscures far too much nuance and information we need to ensure that we craft strategies that address the problems we face, and not those we imagine. Most of these topics deserve their own posts, and not merely one or two paragraphs in a large post. However, I just wanted to highlight these for readers, as those I thought were the most important aspects in the President's State of the Union speech.

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AFRICOM and the balance of power in Africa

This month saw the official launch of AFRICOM as a subcommand of European Command, with a view to completing its transition as a separate command by October 2008. I posted earlier this year on the trouble AFRICOM was having in finding a home on the continent. Since then, the situation has gotten better but the US will have to navigate regional politics in order to secure basing rights on the continent.

As recent as a couple of weeks ago, Nigeria made it known that it was discussing, with members of the African Union and ECOWAS, different means of blocking any attempt by the US to set up a base in the Gulf of Guinea. In like manner, South Africa's Defense Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota also issued a statement saying that additional U.S. troops were not welcomed in the continent, adding that this was the unanimous position of the Southern African Development Community, which is made up of fourteen African countries. Additionally, he threatened any African country willing to base American military forces with the consequences of their actions, implying a cooling of relations with its African neighbors. This was perceived by many to be directed at those few countries that have already stated an interest in housing Africa Command. Among these are Liberia, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Gabon, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and possibly Botswana, which recently disclosed discussions with South Africa and the US regarding AFRICOM. This revelation, however, was made two weeks ago and prior to Defense Minister Lekota's statement on the issue.

There are many reasons for the resistance to the hosting of AFRICOM bases in the continent. These range from those mentioned in other posts, such as the fear that hosting an AFRICOM station would make the host country a likely target for al Qaeda operations, to fear of the influence the US would be able to exert within the host country itself and the region due to its military presence. This, without mentioning the perception (in large part thanks to US support for Ethiopia's operations in Somalia) that AFRICOM will result in the complete militarization of American Foreign Policy in Africa; its creation already being seen as the official arrival of the Global War on Terror in the continent.

The US, seeking to quell some of these fears, has repeatedly emphasized that AFRICOM, more than anything is about "the four Ps and the three Ds: Prevention of conflict, promotion of regional stability, protection of American and African interests and prevailing against the rise of extremism through diplomacy, development and defense. The problem, of course, is that the CJTF-Horn of Africa was described in the same way, and that image was shattered by the US government's endorsement of Ethiopia's actions in Somalia, followed by the use of American military force in the country. As argued in