The different levels of strategy, and Iraq

At Arms and Influence, Kingdaddy has an excellent post on the different levels of strategy. He uses a recent CNN interview with Joe Lieberman to illustrate what is wrong with the manner in which many Americans see Iraq today, including presidential candidate, Sen. John McCain. During his interview with CNN, Sen. Lieberman while disputing Kyra Phillip's assertion that many Iraqis don't want another Republican president in the White House, said this:

...there will be genocide and bloodshed, and Iran and al Qaeda will win, and we'll loose.

According to Kingdaddy,

For sake of argument, let's agree with Lieberman. We leave, and Iran and Al Qaeda "win." (That's not necessarily true, especially for Al Qaeda, but let's not get off track.) By implication, the United States loses. But what did we lose?

Kindaddy argues that it is important to separate the different levels of strategy: Grand strategic, theater, operational, tactical, and technical, because "success at one level does not necessarily bring success at all the others" likewise, failure in one theater does not necessarily bring failure at all the others. With regard to Iraq, he argues

If the United States were to lose one part of its theater strategy for the Middle East, it does not portend a cataclysm for the United States in that region, or for the most recently added priority in American grand strategy, counterterrorism.

The United states may have to contain the consequences of occupation and withdrawal, but there are several outcomes that may be eminently tolerable for the United States. The Iraqi factions are likely to remain focused on each other, not the United States. Iran may gain power and influence within Iraq, but exactly how does this automatically translate into a catastrophic loss for the United States? Freed from the Iraq trap, the United States might be able to do more in the Middle East overall, instead of pouring more blood and treasure into a single country. Americans might live in less danger of terrorist attack, if the American occupation no longer inspires outrage against the United states.

As a means of understanding this let's look back at the British Empire in the late 1700's. In 1775 the American colonies declared themselves independent of the British Crown. For the next eight years the British expended blood and treasure to bring the American colonists back under the fold. Due to their superior naval strength, they were able to take over most coastal cities in America, but were unable to take the countryside, due to their small land army (in comparison to the landmass they had to control). In 1778, after the American victory at Saratoga, France signed a treaty of alliance with the new American republic and declared war on Britain later that summer. In the next two years, Spain and the Dutch also declared war on Britain. The war expanded from one between the British Crown and thirteen of its colonies, to a worldwide struggle for the empire. The French and Spanish attacked the British throughout the West Indies, and Gibraltar. The French also began to contest the control of India with the help of their allies in the Kingdom of Mysore (Southern India).

As if this was not enough, by 1781 French involvement made itself felt in the American colonies and was instrumental in the British defeat at Yorktown in that year. By 1783, the colonial war for independence was over. Freed from having so much of its military might occupied by a colonial uprising and though grudgingly accepting defeat, the British moved to reinforce their position at Gibraltar and other theaters, including India and the West Indies. The British were so successful in repositioning their forces, that not only did they retain control of India and Gibraltar, but by the end of the war they had returned the West Indies to the status quo ante, with Britain as the preeminent power in the region. In this instance, it is clear that the British defeat on American soil, far from being cataclysmic, actually allowed it to commit its forces to regions were they could have an impact. In fact, after 1783 trade between the United States and Britain grew overwhelmingly and continued to do so, until the War of 1812.

I'm not a scholar on the war of Independence, and relied heavily for this post on wikipedia, so if anyone finds any historical inaccuracies please alert me to them, and I will correct them at once. Also, this post is not arguing that we are losing in Iraq, though this blogger believes that unless more radical changes take place within the country, it is hard to see how we can win (at least in the manner defined by this administration). The post is only meant to highlight the most important points brought forth by Kingdaddy at Arms and Influence, while also providing one more example of how a defeat in one theater, does not necessarily mean a defeat for our global strategy.

In short, we need to move beyond the myopic view of win/lose with regard to Iraq, and focus more profoundly on what we need to do to correct our strategy and succeed in defeating the more potent threats we face in this misnamed global war on terror, while also managing the global order we underpin. We can't have that discussion until many on the right stop simplifying the Iraq war to slogans of win-lose, appeasers vs. patriots, etc. In like manner, we also need to move beyond what has become the slogan for many on the left "McCain wants 100 yrs of war." He does not, he merely compared the American presence in Iraq (at least how he would like to see it) to that of South Korea, Germany and Japan. That is, he looks forward to a time when the United States will have troops in Iraq, not fighting insurgents or militias, but merely as a guarantee of allegiance and aid for the government of Iraq. Can you attack him for wishful thinking, perhaps, but to dumb down a legitimate difference of viewpoint (that Iraq can achieve such stability) to the simplistic slogan noted above is not helpful to anyone, or our need to truly debate what it is we are going to do moving forward.

Here's the full version of what Sen. Lieberman said. The statement referenced in this post, and Kingdaddy's comes near the end of the interview. The video itself is from ThinkProgress, hence my rant above on moving away from sloganeering as they once again repeat the strawman attack that McCain wants us in Iraq for 100yrs of war.

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US military: Head of al Qaeda in Iraq has not been captured

Sometimes, a little sarcasm goes a long way. The most appropriate headline for the news reports that surfaced yesterday on the "capture of the head of al Qaeda in Iraq comes to us courtesy of FARK.com.

The head of al Qaeda in Iraq who has reportedly been killed three times, captured twice, mortally wounded once is apparently free again.

As commenter Kilo at Abu Muqawama's blog aptly put it, he's the " fkn roadrunner." Beep, beep.

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On the State of the Union speech

In this post, I won't focus too much on the President's domestic agenda. Instead, I just want to highlight a few items he mentioned in his State of the Union address with regard to foreign affairs, which I consider important.

One of the most important policy initiatives the President mentioned was Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance, which he mentioned right after asking Congress to pass the Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea. The FTA's are important, particularly as the US tries to stem the tide against Hugo Chavez' Bolivarian Revolution, which has spread from Venezuela to Bolivia, Ecuador and to a lesser extent Nicaragua. To be fair, there are many issues within these countries that have aided Chavismo in its pursuit, but Colombia, and Mexico have served to a large extent as bulwarks against Chavez' influence. Passing the FTA with Colombia rewards a strong ally, and one who has also taken on extremely difficult issues within his own country; issues that have cost him politically, both in stature, but also in political allies who have been forced to resign from his government for their ties to right-wing military groups accused of egregious human rights violations. These issues, however, would be better explored in a post solely dedicated to Colombia.

With regard to South Korea, the FTA is much warranted, as that country has seen much of its investment flowing to China to take advantage of the opportunities that the Chinese juggernaut presents. Opening markets, preferentially to South Korea would aid them in attracting more FDI as China, among others try to take advantage of the opportunities the FTA provides for South Korean exporters. It would also likely make South Korea a bit more cooperative on the issue of North Korea's nuclear disarmament, which is likely to be a very important issue as a new president takes office come next January.

Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance would make the passage of these FTAs easier, as it would address at least one aspect of concern for members of Congress who are less than enthusiastic about passing another FTA, for fear of the job losses the US is likely to incur as a result. The program, if funded, can help Americans so affected by providing with among other things, rapid response assistance, reemployment services, job search allowances, relocation allowances, training and income support. I suspect that even this may not be enough to get these FTAs passed through Congress, as there is much anti-Free Trade sentiment there nowadays, mostly due to out current economic woes.

Perhaps the most important policy initiative put forth by the President in this State of the Union, one Tom Barnett has repeatedly and forcefully argued for, is that of purchasing food aid, not from American farmers, but rather from local farmers in the countries to which the aid is going. In this way, we not only provide famine stricken areas with food aid, but also jump start their local economies thereby reconnecting them, ever so slightly to the global market. It was unclear from the president's statement, whether the food aid would be purchased from farmers in the specific country we are trying to help, or from the third world in general. The distinction is important as purchasing food aid from emerging agricultural power houses would aid these in achieving first world status. This policy proposal will now doubt be fought tooth and nail by our agricultural lobby, and powerful congressmen such as Tom Lantos, who have opposed such initiatives in the past. However, if there's a proposal specifically designed to shrink the Gap, and truly focus our development aid (and humanitarian aid) where it is most needed, this is it. The President being a lame duck at this point is unlikely to gain much traction on this issue, but it is at least noteworthy that he mentioned it.

The President also seemed to bring to the fore a new "Axis of Despotism(?)," by naming Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus and Burma, at least three if which don't get much time in the American press, as countries where the US supports freedom. However, it is unlikely that any new initiatives will pass during the next 11 months that would seek to implement any policy with regard to these states. That may be a good thing, since given the changing political dynamic within Cuba, at least, the worst thing we could do is give the new leadership an excuse to close themselves further, or to rally nationalist sentiment against the US. The least we intervene in Cuba, the more they have to focus on their internal problems, as Iran has demonstrated to some extent following the lowering of tensions between the US and Iran. Of course, the President, seemingly failing to heed the message, directed some of his comments to Iran, something that can only help Ahmedinejad in rallying conservatives and nationalists to his side once again; people who have seemingly abandoned him as of late, due to his incompetence and mismanagement of the Iranian economy (among them, Ayatollah Khamenei). As others will likely note, asking Iran to give up its Ace before sitting at the negotiating table, will not happen. It's nuclear program is leverage, without which it knows it can't get what it wants. This however, is also a subject best tackled in its own post as it is too complicated to flesh out in a paragraph.

One of the few points where I disagreed with the President was on this overtly broad statement:

In the past seven years, we've also seen the images that have sobered us. We've watched throngs of mourners in Lebanon and Pakistan carrying the caskets of beloved leaders taken by the assassins' hands.

We've seen wedding guests in blood-soaked finery staggering from a hotel in Jordan, Afghans and Iraqis blown up in mosques and markets, and trains in London and Madrid ripped apart by bombs

We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear.

....that is why the terrorists are fighting to deny this choice to the people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Palestinian territories.

I don't much disagee that we are indeed fighting terrorists in some of these places, my problem, rather is from his using the "terrorists" to describe them all, lumping separate conflicts under one banner while also seeming to tie them to al Qaeda. In Lebanon, the major is not against al Qaeda, but rather against Iran and Syria's attempt to increase their influence in the country and aid their quasi-proxy, Hezbollah. That conflict is intimately tied to Iran's rise and the reshaping geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, in what Vali Nasr has termed the Shia Revival. Being Shiites, or secularists in the case of Syria, these countries see al Qaeda as enemies, not allies. To boot, Iran helped us during the Afghan campaign because al Qaeda, being a Sunni fundamentalist entity and ideology sees Shiites as worst than even the infidel West.

Iraq, for the most part, has become part of that struggle, with Sunnis seeking a better contract than the one they were presented with following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. It is also a conflict between and among Shiites, who have differing visions of the future of Iraq. It also involves the Kurds and their own dreams for self-actualization, and the security interests of Turkey, Iran and Syria, all of which have a substantial minority Kurdish population. Al Qaeda in Iraq, is but a minor player, powerful to be sure, but surrounded by enemies on all sides, including now, the Sunnis who have chosen to side with the US against their one time ally.

The Palestinian territories have more to do with Israels right to security and Palestinian's valid claims for nationhood. Most of the violence there centers on intra-Palestinian issues that have little, if nothing, to do with our GWOT against al Qaeda.

In fact, of all these, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have major problems with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and hence, the terrorists who attacked on us on September 11, 2001. Even here, however, there are deeper issues centered on Pakistan's need for a friendlier, neutral government in Afghanistan so as to avoid the prospect of a two front war, if it were to start one with India. So long as we don't address some of Pakistan's security needs in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they will do much to stamp out the Taliban, or al Qaeda, as they would see these (particularly the Taliban) as a means of retaining influence in Afghanistan. In lumping all of these different conflicts together under the moniker of terrorism, the President makes it seem as if they are all related to the main fight against al Qaeda. They are important, to be sure, but thinking of them solely in terms of al Qaeda or the GWOT obscures far too much nuance and information we need to ensure that we craft strategies that address the problems we face, and not those we imagine. Most of these topics deserve their own posts, and not merely one or two paragraphs in a large post. However, I just wanted to highlight these for readers, as those I thought were the most important aspects in the President's State of the Union speech.

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Lessons from the British withdrawal from Iraq

As the Brits prepare to withdraw from Iraq later this year, they are having to face one of the least talked about problems resultant from our occupation of Iraq. Once we leave, what happens to those Iraqis who worked with the coalition as a means of helping their own country? For all intents and purposes, they are seen by other Iraqis, particularly those belonging to militias and insurgent groups as collaborators and traitors to the Iraqi state, and their respective religious/tribal grouping. Once we leave, they are as good as dead. Indeed, some already have been killed, gruesomely.

Britain has come under increased criticism, including from the Iraqi government for its seeming willingness to abandon these Iraqis to their fate. That of course, speaks volumes about the British failure in southern Iraq as well as of its poor preparation in planning its withdrawal. Part of the reason this question has to be contemplated is that as Britain withdraws, it is becoming clear that far from leaving a stable southern region, it will be leaving a volatile and violent one where different Shiite militias are beginning to battle for supremacy and control over territory and the lucrative opium trade.

As a result of the outcry against Britain's limited asylum policy toward Iraqis who aided them in Iraq, Prime Minister Brown has ordered a review of his government's policy. According to some figures, up to 20,000 Iraqis worked for British troops since 2003, but only 600 are currently employed now. This means that if Britain were to grant asylum to its Iraqi employees, at a minimum it would have to grant 600 applications to employees and their families. This without mentioning what Britain may have to do for the families of its Iraqi employees that have already been killed, and who know are also targets for retribution. According to the article, Denmark provides a better example of how to handle this issue. They "airlifted interpreters and their families – a total of 200 people – out of the country when its soldiers withdrew last month."

As mentioned above, even the Iraqi government is pushing for Britain to address the problem of helping those who aided Britain to get out of the country. This a seeming acknowledgment of the Iraqi government's growing inability to handle the security of their own population, even in the southern part of the country.

At the same time, the British are also confronting another issue we will likely need to confront as we withdraw from Iraq. General Sir Michael Rose, told the independent that "We have not enough troops there to make any impact. We have to decide whether the risks and the losses we are suffering are worth it." Put another way, how do we withdraw to ensure that as we move troops out of the country, we don't end up in a situation where the troops left behind are not at greater risk of being killed because they have not the personnel or fire-power to ensure their safety. This is brought to bear in the Independent's article as they tell us that as troop numbers have been reduced, casualties have increased. This paragraph gives us a stark picture of what type of withdrawal the Brits are now confronting, and perhaps a glimpse of our own:

At the beginning of the year, Britain had just over 7,000 troops in two provinces in south-east Iraq. Now, following the handover of security in Maysan province and bases in Basra city to the Iraqis, the remaining force of 5,500 is confined to just two: the contingency operating base at Basra airport and a battle group of 500 at Basra Palace, which is to all intents and purposes under siege. The British contingent is expected to decline to 5,000 once Basra Palace is turned over to Iraqi forces this summer, leaving the airport base, increasingly under attack, as the only British outpost in Iraq.

The situation has deteriorated to such a point, that Generals (it is unclear if these are former or current generals from the article) are openly questioning whether Britain will have to "consider some kind of fighting withdrawal."

As someone who has at times advocated a full-withdrawal (mostly in exasperation at this administration's incompetence), these are some of the same questions that have troubled me. For anyone, particularly our current Presidential contenders advocating withdrawal from Iraq (rapid or otherwise) this are some of the main issues we will have to deal with to ensure not only a safe withdrawal for out troops, but also a means to aid those Iraqis who risked, and continue to risk their lives to help us and their country.

The examples and argument above, to reiterate, are not meant as arguments against withdrawing, but rather as constructive criticisms for the issues we need to address if we so choose to withdraw from Iraq. As most of you know, I've moved over time in favor of a Biden-Gelb like approach where we first move to quell or at least reduce the violence, before moving to a complete withdrawal. For me, that plan is one of the few that seeks a way to address the sources of violence in the country, while also looking for an exit strategy for American troops. The issues, however, are important because we already made the mistake of going into a war without much thought to how to handle the post-war phase of the campaign despite knowing the issues we would likely face.

It is now incumbent on us to plan our withdrawal from Iraq, better informed by the British experience to ensure that we avoid the pitfalls to which they have fallen prey. Otherwise, we risk repeating this administration's biggest mistake of forgetting lessons learned, and dismissing any information which did not accord with their stated policy and that would be a disservice not only to ourselves, and the soldiers currently risking their lives on a daily basis, but also to our country and those who have paid the ultimate price for, among other things, the mismanagement of this war.

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Sen. Biden's "soft partition" plan gains momentum

This according to Helene Cooper who cites an administration official stating "The truth is, we could end up close to the Biden-Gelb proposal." Though the administration is still behind the surge, there are clear indications that we are moving toward a Biden-Gelb approach, Cooper cites the positive reception to aspects of the plan from not only administration officials (as cited above), but also Foreign policy analysts, Capitol Hill politicians. I reviewed Sen. Biden's plan earlier this year here.

The arming of Sunni tribes and non-al Qaeda insurgents fits in this pattern, by allowing Sunnis (in this example) room to run their own security apparatus in Sunni majority regions. For obvious reasons, the Shiite led government isn't too happy about this.

The current plan moves toward a Biden-Gelb approach in decentralizing security in Sunni regions, devolving power to native forces, and moving away from using a largely Shiite army and police force to quell violence in largely Sunni areas. That approach has not worked, as many of these security forces have become infiltrated by Shiite militias bent on avenging years of oppression by Saddam Hussein and/or attacks by Sunni insurgents (particularly al Qaeda in Iraq) on Shiite civilians.

According to Cooper, the State Department in now pushing a proposal to "build up provincial reconstruction teams out in the Iraqi provinces, with the goal of strengthening local tribal leaders," further devolving power to the regions from the central government.

In language reminiscent of Tom Barnett, Sen. Biden has argued that "We're going to get there (soft-partition) either by our action or by our inaction; what we need to do is to manage this transition." Already he has gone to the UN Security Council to seek support for such a change in policy and was well received, with at least one person stating "What took you guys so long?".

As I pointed out in my review of Sen. Biden's plan, there are still some issues that have to be addressed, including the problem of how to deal with militias such as the Mahdi army which though primarily Shiite, are unlikely to accept such a partition quietly. This, in addition to the very treacherous waters we will have to navigate to get Iran, Syria, and Turkey to accept an autonomous Kurdish region in the north, not to mention the difficult issue of allocation of oil revenues. For a more in-depth look at the problems I found with Sen. Biden's plan, please click here. Already, Maliki is threatening to arm (as if this was not already happening) Shiite militias to counter U.S. efforts to arm Sunnis. So any partition plan, even a soft one will be fraught with a lot of problems from the start. Still, this now seems inevitable given the fact that as Cooper points out, Sunnis and Shiites (despite celebrating Iraq's soccer championship together) have shown little signs of seeking reconciliation.

What I like about Sen. Biden's plan is that it allows us to move away from the win-loose/stay the course-cut and run arguments heard so often with regard to Iraq. Instead it provides a real strategy for managing the conflict, allowing us to disengage responsibly, as well as giving us space to re-craft our strategy in fighting the much larger GWOT (or long war, or whatever it is we are calling it now). It's good to see it gaining some momentum.

As an aside, given how much time and effort Sen. Biden is giving one of the most important issues in our country, not to mention the 2008 campaign, (and the fact that by all accounts he has performed very well in every single debate so far) it sometimes baffles me that he is not taken more seriously by the media or voters. As E.J. Dionne Jr. asked following the early debates in June "Does Joe Biden have to set himself on fire to get serious attention?"

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