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Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts

Sunday, April 27, 2008

Hamid Karzai escapes Taliban attack (Updated)

The ceremony in Kabul, was commemorating the 16th anniversary of Afghanistan's victory over the Soviet invasion, which is also known as Victory Day/Mujahideen Day and consists of a parade where Afghanistan showcases its military power, including troops, tanks and aircraft. Just as the national anthem ended, shots rang out from abandoned houses a few yards from where the VIP's were seated hitting the back of the stage. The press is reporting that at least 3 people were killed and 9 wounded; among the dead, a small child and a parliamentarian (the latter died from wounds sustained during the attack).

According to the AFP, there were also large explosions, likely caused by rocket propelled grenades, which landed near the stage. Although President Karzai appeared in a news conference following the attack to state that everything was calm and that some of the perpetrators had been captured, the Taliban issued a statement saying that the purpose of the attack was not to kill any high level target, including Hamid Karzai, but was merely a means to show that it could attack anywhere in the country with impunity.

Indeed, the attack seems to have achieved the Taliban's stated objective as they were able to execute it, despite tightened security provided by Afghan and allied forces, and in the midst of a display of Afghanistan's military power. What's more, a Taliban spokesman claimed to have had help from within the Afghan security forces, bringing into question not only their ability to fight the insurgency, but also, their loyalty. It remains to be seen what the psychological shock of the event will be, both within Afghanistan (President Karzai and his security forces have been embarrassed on a day that was supposed to showcase their power), and NATO member states, particularly those who have been reluctant to increase their military presence in the country, or to engage in a more serious counter-insurgency effort.

Even more importantly, given President Karzai's recent criticism of US and British military operations as undermining his authority and preventing him from negotiating a cease-fire with insurgents, it remains to be seen what the impact of this attack will be. Additionally, on the American side, this latest attack will likely harden its position against negotiating with the Taliban, something it has criticized the British and Afghan governments for doing at various points. In addition, the manner in which the latest attack will impact upon the upcoming election in Afghanistan is important since support for President Karzai is flagging and as a result, relations between the US, Britain and his government are increasingly strained. Even more importantly, the attack happened even as the US and Afghan forces not only tightened security, as mentioned above, but also despite raids conducted in the preceding days, such as that in Kapisa, where Taliban militants were believed to be planning attacks for today's celebrations.

India and Pakistan have both expressed outrage over the attack, but given relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, at least one of these will get short shrift (even though relations between the two seem to be improving under the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani).

The attack also demonstrates how much still remains to be done to secure Afghanistan from the Taliban and al Qaeda, and how our efforts are being hampered by our continued presence in Iraq, where the host of enemies we are fighting, be they the PKK in northern Iraq, al Sadr's Mahdi army in southern Iraq, and Sunni tribesmen, who with the exception of AQI, have little or nothing to do with our larger war against al Qaeda. Additionally, one of the things this attack brings to the fore is the importance of Hamid Karzai to US plans in Afghanistan, or our over reliance on single political figures in countries in the region, be it Pervez Musharaff in Pakistan, Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, or Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq. A weakness al Qaeda and others will continue to go after, until the US moves to crafting overall strategies divorced from specific political/military figures in these countries.

The BBC has a set of 8 images documenting the parade and attack here.

Related Links

Long War Journal

President Karzai escapes assassination bid, parliamentarian killed

Abu Muqawama

The Latest Attack in Kabul

These spectacular attacks in the cities will undermine support for the government and the Coalition. The Taliban are now nationally an advanced phase II (Strategic Stalemate) insurgency with an increasingly capable propaganda capability. They face a Coalition and government without a comprehensive strategy (we'll see if ISAF signs on to the recently approved Afghan National Development Strategy after the Paris Conference). The chief of the Coalition, GEN McNeill, has just reminded the country that the international community does not plan to stay by suggesting a name change from "International Security Assistance Force" to "Interim Security Assistance Force." What better way to reinforce the standard Taliban propaganda that the Coalition may have the watches, but the Taliban have all the time.

Registan.Net

Karzai Lives to Rule Kabul for Another Day

This is, sadly, an enormous propaganda coup for the Taliban, who have seen their cachet in Afghanistan increase during an escalation of activity over the last year that had previously peaked at the attack on the Serena Hotel. The implications are dire: for years, the running joke has been that Karzai is only the Mayor of Kabul and not President of the country; this attack, which is the second deadly attack on high-profile targets in Kabul in four months, demonstrates just how little control he has even over Kabul. What’s worse is, the apparent ease with which two fire teams got within a few hundred feet of the President indicates that increasing segments of the population are allowing militants to roam freely.

AP video: Taliban attack on Afghanistan's Victory Day parade.

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Monday, January 28, 2008

On the State of the Union speech

In this post, I won't focus too much on the President's domestic agenda. Instead, I just want to highlight a few items he mentioned in his State of the Union address with regard to foreign affairs, which I consider important.

One of the most important policy initiatives the President mentioned was Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance, which he mentioned right after asking Congress to pass the Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea. The FTA's are important, particularly as the US tries to stem the tide against Hugo Chavez' Bolivarian Revolution, which has spread from Venezuela to Bolivia, Ecuador and to a lesser extent Nicaragua. To be fair, there are many issues within these countries that have aided Chavismo in its pursuit, but Colombia, and Mexico have served to a large extent as bulwarks against Chavez' influence. Passing the FTA with Colombia rewards a strong ally, and one who has also taken on extremely difficult issues within his own country; issues that have cost him politically, both in stature, but also in political allies who have been forced to resign from his government for their ties to right-wing military groups accused of egregious human rights violations. These issues, however, would be better explored in a post solely dedicated to Colombia.

With regard to South Korea, the FTA is much warranted, as that country has seen much of its investment flowing to China to take advantage of the opportunities that the Chinese juggernaut presents. Opening markets, preferentially to South Korea would aid them in attracting more FDI as China, among others try to take advantage of the opportunities the FTA provides for South Korean exporters. It would also likely make South Korea a bit more cooperative on the issue of North Korea's nuclear disarmament, which is likely to be a very important issue as a new president takes office come next January.

Reform Trade Adjustment Assistance would make the passage of these FTAs easier, as it would address at least one aspect of concern for members of Congress who are less than enthusiastic about passing another FTA, for fear of the job losses the US is likely to incur as a result. The program, if funded, can help Americans so affected by providing with among other things, rapid response assistance, reemployment services, job search allowances, relocation allowances, training and income support. I suspect that even this may not be enough to get these FTAs passed through Congress, as there is much anti-Free Trade sentiment there nowadays, mostly due to out current economic woes.

Perhaps the most important policy initiative put forth by the President in this State of the Union, one Tom Barnett has repeatedly and forcefully argued for, is that of purchasing food aid, not from American farmers, but rather from local farmers in the countries to which the aid is going. In this way, we not only provide famine stricken areas with food aid, but also jump start their local economies thereby reconnecting them, ever so slightly to the global market. It was unclear from the president's statement, whether the food aid would be purchased from farmers in the specific country we are trying to help, or from the third world in general. The distinction is important as purchasing food aid from emerging agricultural power houses would aid these in achieving first world status. This policy proposal will now doubt be fought tooth and nail by our agricultural lobby, and powerful congressmen such as Tom Lantos, who have opposed such initiatives in the past. However, if there's a proposal specifically designed to shrink the Gap, and truly focus our development aid (and humanitarian aid) where it is most needed, this is it. The President being a lame duck at this point is unlikely to gain much traction on this issue, but it is at least noteworthy that he mentioned it.

The President also seemed to bring to the fore a new "Axis of Despotism(?)," by naming Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus and Burma, at least three if which don't get much time in the American press, as countries where the US supports freedom. However, it is unlikely that any new initiatives will pass during the next 11 months that would seek to implement any policy with regard to these states. That may be a good thing, since given the changing political dynamic within Cuba, at least, the worst thing we could do is give the new leadership an excuse to close themselves further, or to rally nationalist sentiment against the US. The least we intervene in Cuba, the more they have to focus on their internal problems, as Iran has demonstrated to some extent following the lowering of tensions between the US and Iran. Of course, the President, seemingly failing to heed the message, directed some of his comments to Iran, something that can only help Ahmedinejad in rallying conservatives and nationalists to his side once again; people who have seemingly abandoned him as of late, due to his incompetence and mismanagement of the Iranian economy (among them, Ayatollah Khamenei). As others will likely note, asking Iran to give up its Ace before sitting at the negotiating table, will not happen. It's nuclear program is leverage, without which it knows it can't get what it wants. This however, is also a subject best tackled in its own post as it is too complicated to flesh out in a paragraph.

One of the few points where I disagreed with the President was on this overtly broad statement:

In the past seven years, we've also seen the images that have sobered us. We've watched throngs of mourners in Lebanon and Pakistan carrying the caskets of beloved leaders taken by the assassins' hands.

We've seen wedding guests in blood-soaked finery staggering from a hotel in Jordan, Afghans and Iraqis blown up in mosques and markets, and trains in London and Madrid ripped apart by bombs

We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear.

....that is why the terrorists are fighting to deny this choice to the people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Palestinian territories.

I don't much disagee that we are indeed fighting terrorists in some of these places, my problem, rather is from his using the "terrorists" to describe them all, lumping separate conflicts under one banner while also seeming to tie them to al Qaeda. In Lebanon, the major is not against al Qaeda, but rather against Iran and Syria's attempt to increase their influence in the country and aid their quasi-proxy, Hezbollah. That conflict is intimately tied to Iran's rise and the reshaping geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, in what Vali Nasr has termed the Shia Revival. Being Shiites, or secularists in the case of Syria, these countries see al Qaeda as enemies, not allies. To boot, Iran helped us during the Afghan campaign because al Qaeda, being a Sunni fundamentalist entity and ideology sees Shiites as worst than even the infidel West.

Iraq, for the most part, has become part of that struggle, with Sunnis seeking a better contract than the one they were presented with following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. It is also a conflict between and among Shiites, who have differing visions of the future of Iraq. It also involves the Kurds and their own dreams for self-actualization, and the security interests of Turkey, Iran and Syria, all of which have a substantial minority Kurdish population. Al Qaeda in Iraq, is but a minor player, powerful to be sure, but surrounded by enemies on all sides, including now, the Sunnis who have chosen to side with the US against their one time ally.

The Palestinian territories have more to do with Israels right to security and Palestinian's valid claims for nationhood. Most of the violence there centers on intra-Palestinian issues that have little, if nothing, to do with our GWOT against al Qaeda.

In fact, of all these, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have major problems with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and hence, the terrorists who attacked on us on September 11, 2001. Even here, however, there are deeper issues centered on Pakistan's need for a friendlier, neutral government in Afghanistan so as to avoid the prospect of a two front war, if it were to start one with India. So long as we don't address some of Pakistan's security needs in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that they will do much to stamp out the Taliban, or al Qaeda, as they would see these (particularly the Taliban) as a means of retaining influence in Afghanistan. In lumping all of these different conflicts together under the moniker of terrorism, the President makes it seem as if they are all related to the main fight against al Qaeda. They are important, to be sure, but thinking of them solely in terms of al Qaeda or the GWOT obscures far too much nuance and information we need to ensure that we craft strategies that address the problems we face, and not those we imagine. Most of these topics deserve their own posts, and not merely one or two paragraphs in a large post. However, I just wanted to highlight these for readers, as those I thought were the most important aspects in the President's State of the Union speech.

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Saturday, March 31, 2007

The side we should always be on

Thomas Barnett gets it. He wrote this post in response to some of his readers, who questioned him, as to why he did not always side with the President during the surge. As usual, he is able to capture better than most, the reasons why blind support for a policy, administration or political party is never in the interest of our country. Rather than tell you about about what Barnett wrote, I'll just let you read it yourself. Below, are some of the most important excerpts from his substantive post.

The side I've always been on

I supported Bush's Big Bang decision to topple Saddam. To me, it was never about WMD, which is an overblown fear (it's not the ultimate Rubicon now that global war is off the agenda, it's just a super-weapon that we must deal with). To me, it was about a rule-set breaker who flouted the will of the global community for years on end.

...Bush refused to take advantage of the changes he himself set so effectively in motion in the region. There was a huge groundswell of change across the Middle East the first 18 months following the war. When he had the chance to start regional dialogues that addressed the real fights of the region (Iran v Israel, Iran v Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda v House of Saud), he did not. He stubbornly stayed the course in Iraq, pretending an internal solution was possible in what quickly and logically became a regional conflict that all players on all sides are effectively conflating in a host of asymmetrical ways.

Bush's first great answer was to rerun the entire WMD drama on Iran.

Bush's second great answer was the surge. As I wrote several times earlier: the surge with serious regional diplomacy--that I would gladly support.

But the surge without serious regional and international diplomacy--that I do not support.

I do not support it because it is designed to [fail.]

I do not support it because I think it's Bush's ruse to Iranify the Long War.

I think that if Bush attacks Iran on his watch, he'll screw up the Big Bang permanently and could quite easily trigger a long-term rivalry with Russia and China in the region.

...People who act like you either support Bush's mismanagement of this postwar or you're un-American are myopic in the extreme. They're acting like we should put our entire team on the field for the extra point when we need to score a couple more touchdowns before the game clock runs out.

We are told: Why negotiate with people who don't want us to win?

I will tell you why: because we're not going to win--or lose. We're either going to keep the Big Bang rolling or we're going to let it die and let the region go right back to what it was. Not every play in this game is going to be for positive yardage. Sometimes we'll punt and play for field position.

And yeah, when we screw up royally, we'll take our medicine.

We've screwed up Iraq (outside of Kurdistan) and if we want to cut down our exposure, we'll have to accept many compromises. You can get mad about that and blame Bush or you can get mad about that and pretend the Left "stabbed us in the back." But stubborn is as stubborn does and Bush made all the big decisions, so whine about that or move along, because when the Dems tie his hands now it's not about preventing some illusory "win" in Iraq, it's about stopping a strategically idiotic war with Iran, which won't fix Iraq but make our entire effort there to date a complete waste of blood and treasure.

Bush, in my mind, has no idea how to win at this point. He pretends we can screw up and then take no pain for our efforts, so he eschews negotiations with people who have no intention of helping anyone but themselves (duh!). So both they, and everyone else involved in Iraq will continue to screw us, and both our blood and our treasure will continue to go largely wasted until Bush loses the stubbornness or simply leaves office.

...I want to win. I just don't pretend we can come back on a single drive from being behind several scores.

...The point right now is how we move ahead, not how we save this presidency.

...I believe in the United States, not in any one leader.

And I want to win in the end, not on the next play.

So let me be clear as crystal: my guys never leave office. They are there administration after administration. They know exactly what I'm about and I know exactly what they're about, and we get along just fine.

The politicians, meanwhile, get exactly what they deserve.

This captures much of what I believe, including my reasons for supporting the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003. It also captures in a nutshell the conviction that drives my politics, mainly, that when all is said and done, the decision of who to support politically is never about party loyalty or affiliation, but rather, about what is best for our country. Idealistic? Perhaps, but that is one of the main foundations upon which this country was built; An idealism that drove us to build a government that was better than any that had existed previously. Sure, we have not always lived up to that ideal, in fact there have been times when we have failed miserably, but that has not stopped us from trying.

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Friday, March 30, 2007

Response to Krauthammer's "Which is 'the real war'?"

This is my response to blog friend, Marc Schulman's post on Charles Krauthammer's Op-ed in today's Washington Post. Please read the Krauthammer piece and Marc's post before delving into my response.

Also, I would like to thank Marc at American Future for upgrading my comment to a post in his own blog, and at The Moderate Voice. For a small blog like my own, such promotion is not an everyday occurrence, but very much welcomed. Again, thanks Marc.

I will disagree with Krauthammer here. First, he says that the assumption that “the world’s one superpower, which spends more on defense every year than the rest of the world combined, does not have the capacity to fight an insurgency in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan” is mistaken. I disagree, as this has been borne by events. Our commanders have in fact said that our armed forces are stretched thin, and that they are near their breaking point. This is particularly true of our ground forces like the army, marines and National Guard. Krauthammer makes much on the fact that we spend so much more on defense than the rest of the world, which is true. However, much of that spending has traditionally gone to acquire high end platforms and technology which has ill-served us in fighting insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have not spent that money on our troops, either in on languages, cultural understanding or counter-insurgency training, nor on their health care as recent events have borne out (the Walter Reed debacle).

Krauthammer argues that those who want us to focus on Afghanistan as opposed to Iraq make a mistaken assumption, mainly, “that Afghanistan is strategically more important than Iraq.” His thought experiment, however, fails to prove his own assumption, that Iraq is more important than Afghanistan.

To begin, in bringing a neutral observer to decide, we would have to provide him with all of the facts. For example, we would have to tell him that it was in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, a place completely disconnected from the world, where al Qaeda not only trained, but planned for the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, it is there (particularly among the Pashtuns) that radical Islam has found many advocates, and the fact that the Pashtuns are the most important ethnic group in the country. To this you would also have to add that these Pashtuns do not recognize the Durand Line which supposedly separates a nuclear armed Pakistan from Afghanistan. This means, that if al Qaeda were to reestablish itself in Afghanistan, with Pashto aid, could potentially destabilize Pakistan, or precipitate an Indo-Pakistani conflict, such as that which they attempted to initiate following the Sept. 11 attacks. Afghanistan is also en entry way into Central Asia’s former Soviet republics, where hundreds of caches of nuclear material are still readily available in the black market and where, due to the nature of the repressive regimes in the region is also ripe for jihad. Add to all of this the fact that Afghanistan is currently the largest producers of opium in the world, bringing it millions of dollars in revenue each year; revenue, which has gone directly to finance its Taliban insurgency.

Moreover, and moving to Iraq, you would also have to tell the Martian that Iraq is almost 60% Shiite, 20% Kurd and 20% Sunni Arab. You would also have to tell him that The Shiites and the Kurds control all of the oil wealth of the country, and that due to their recent history under Saddam Hussein, neither Shiites nor Kurds likes the Sunni Baathists in Iraq. Additionally, you would have to tell this poor Martian, that the Kurds have an effective military organization (the Peshmerga), a working government and great economic prosperity which they have zealously and successfully protected from the violence in the rest of Iraq. In addition, to this, you would also tell the Martian that the Shiite south, has decently sized militias that can protect most of the South (excluding Baghdad and its environs) from Sunni violence and that they have been ruthless in prosecuting their own revenge war against the Sunnis in Iraq. In addition, their economy is growing steadily and closely with Iran (the largest Shiite state in the region, and also a target for Sunni Salafi Jihadists who see it in a worst light than the evil West). In fact, as many strategists have argued, Kurdish Iraq is a success. So is Southern Shiite Iraq (to an extent, except for the fact that it is more closely beholden to Iran than to the US). Our main failure, has been at the intersection of the three ethnic groups, and largely Sunni Iraq, which has no oil wealth or many other natural resources to make it a viable state, and hence one of the main reasons why we are trying to keep any future Iraqi state united. In addition, we would have to mention that unlike a Taliban-al Qaeda controlled Afghanistan; a Sunni Arab Iraq would be surrounded by almost all hostile states. It would have to worry about Hashemite Jordan to its West, Saudi Arabia to its South, Shiite Arab Iraq to its southeast, Kurdish state to its North, a secular ally of Iran in Syria to its northwest, and a belligerent Iran to its east. All of these states fear al Qaeda, as much, if not more than we do, because ultimately, they are the main targets of the organization and their revolution in the region (and all of their governments are seen as evil and apostate).

This is a far more complex question, and not as simple as Krauthammer would like to make it.

He makes much of al Qaeda’s admonition that Iraq is the main battlefront in their war against the West, however, this is a case of selective quoting. For al Qaeda has also said, many times over, that one of their most important strategies in this long war is to bleed the US financially to bankrupt it and in so doing, deny it the ability to continue occupying the Muslim world and allow for the rise of a new power in its midst. The attacks on September 11 bear this out. They were as much symbolic as they were military attacks against us. They attached, out military power (the Pentagon), our political power (the White House or Congress), and our Economic power (the World Trade Center, and the airline industry). Their main purpose was not so much to cause heavy casualties (though it was one of their prime objectives) but also to cripple our economy. For years, they have wanted to fight us on their terms, and in their soil. The Middle East and Afghanistan are such places. However, that does not mean that because they want us fighting there, that we should just walk in blindly into the fight.

Iraq is a state, which as I explained above, and as we all know, is far more complex than simply a Sunni Arab state ready for the taking. In fact, it is largely Shiite (60% of the population), Kurd (roughly 20%), and 20% Sunni Arab and other minorities, with the land divided in a roughly proportional way. The Shiites we know will not allow the Sunni Arabs to take their oil resources, and have been pretty successful, if not brutal in defending themselves against the Iraqi insurgency. As pointed out earlier, so have the Kurds. That means that already, roughly 80% of Iraq along with most if not all of its oil reserves are out of the hands of the Sunni Arabs. In addition to this, however, the insurgency itself is not monolithic. The insurgency is composed by various groups, many of which are former Baathists, and as such more nationalist than religious in their outlook and goals (a fact we have been trying to exploit and use against Al Qaeda in Iraq). This means, that even within the insurgency and the territory in Sunni Iraq, not even 20% of it belongs to AQI.

Krauthammer also makes a lot of the fact that many jihadists are flocking to Iraq; however our own intelligence agencies have placed their number at less than 10% of the overall insurgency. What make their impact disproportionate are their suicide operations. Even these, however, account for far less of the violence than the IEDs and other explosions throughout the country. Apart from this, as many reports have pointed out, what motivates many of these people to go to Iraq is the American occupation of it. This means that many of these people (again, as recent reports have borne out) had not, until Iraq subscribed to the Salafi outlook of al Qaeda. In fact, many more recruits have of late been going to Pakistan’s NWFP and to train with the newly founded al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with a view to expanding the war to fields other than Iraq and Afghanistan. This they are doing, with a view to repositioning themselves for the next phase of the long war.

Moreover, even our own military has stated time and again that the biggest threat to Iraq and our mission there, is not al Qaeda or even the larger Sunni insurgency but the Shiite militias that until recently had monopolized violence in the country.

What all of this adds up to, is the fact that al Qaeda does not really have as much committed to Iraq as they would like us to believe. They know they can’t take the country because of the Shiites and the Kurds, and that they can only hold on to a small sliver of what’s left to carry out their jihad. In Afghanistan, however, they have a better chance of taking over a larger portion of the country as the Pashtuns are the most important group within the country, and one which has both ethnic and religious ties to their brethren across the border in nuclear armed Pakistan; a group, which refuses to recognize the Durand Line that divides Pashtunistan between the two countries. A group that has many grievances against both the largely Tajik controlled Afghan government, and the largely Punjabi Pakistani state. A Pakistani state which is fighting for its own legitimacy in the face of various insurgencies in its south against the Balochs, the NFWP against the Pashto and other ethnic minorities that feel disenfranchised by the Punjabis. Pakistan is also a state from where we got the AQ Khan network which trafficked in nuclear technology as far away as North Korea, and Lybia, and filled with security forces and scientists sympathetic to the al Qaeda cause, through sympathy for the ousted Taliban militia of Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda has said time and again, that they want to destroy us politically, militarily and economically, with the latter being the weakest target and also the one that would undermine the former two the most. The best way to do this, at least for a military our size is to force us to engage them in as many battlefields as possible. As such, our strategy should be to engage when it is strategically to our advantage to do so. Hence, the experts that argue that Iraq is a distraction from the real war on terror, mean not that Iraq is not important but rather that given the many actors vying for power in the country, it is one conflict were al Qaeda will have the greatest difficulty in coming out on top. In the same manner, because of all the fault lines the conflict trips, we are also left with 160,000 American troops policing up to 4 different conflicts and possibly a few more, wasting blood and money in conflicts that are not directly related to al Qaeda. For example, currently in Iraq we have 1) a Iraqi Sunni v. Iraqi Shiite conflict; 2) a regional Sunni v. Shiite conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran; 3) an al Qaeda v. America conflict; and a possible 4) hardline Shiite v. America conflict (US. v. Iran). Add to this the fact that the Kurds if they choose independence would also enlarge the conflict to include Turkey, Iran, Syria and others and you have far too many conflicts only 1 or 2 of which are directly related to our war against al Qaeda. That means that we are spending blood and treasure inefficiently, because we are getting a lot less for what we are putting in. This is in addition to the fact that world opinion has never been on our side and our allies are abandoning us one by one from Iraq.

This is not the case in Afghanistan, where not only are we directly fighting the Taliban (an al Qaeda ally, and the only group capable of challenging the Afghan government), and Al Qaeda right next door in Pakistan. Here, we also have global support for the reasons mentioned by Krauthammer and a cleared picture of who the enemy is, and what we are getting in return for the blood and treasure we are sacrificing.

Now this does not mean that we should abandon Iraq and forget about it, rather it is about seeking a better strategy and alternatives to the current morass in which we find ourselves. Marc, has argued here for a quarantining of Iraq. Others have done so as