Is armed humanitarian intervention the answer in Burma?

The blogosphere is fired up by the notion of using force to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Burma/Myanmar. However, is that the right course of action? Notable blogs such as The Duck of Minerva, Hidden Unities and Coming Anarchy have recently posted items discussing this subject. They're not the only ones, over at the Washington Post, Fred Hiatt argues forcefully for the international community to keep the promise made at the UN's 60th anniversary, to "intervene, forcefully if necessary, if a state failed to protect its own people." Anne Applebaum, at Slate makes an equally strong case to use force to deliver aid to the thousands of Burmese affected by this catastrophe. To boot, Robert Kaplan has provided a blue-print for how to do this militarily, even as he also argues for us to hold a realistic view of the dangers involved, echoing former Secretary of State Colin Powell's Pottery Barn rule, "we break it, we own it". Even the French government, through its Foreign Minister, Bernard Koucher, has called for a military humanitarian intervention in this case (The European Commission rejected his proposal). One of the few voices arguing against embarking on such an endeavor is Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye, who questions the premises on which such calls are based, as well as the slippery slope they lead us to, if we are truly to follow the path of military humanitarianism.

Peter at the Duck of Minerva focuses on what factors lead to a possible American intervention, or what would make Burma part of the Axis of Evil. In Burma, the US is not really interested in its natural resources, and though the generals in charge are horrible thugs, they generally keep to themselves, and do not seek to shake the international order, so American interests are not really at stake. In his words:

Moral of the story: if you’re evil, we’ll go to the mattress to take care of business. If you’re just plain bad, you’re probably in the clear.

To be sure, Peter, like most commentators, recognizes that part of the reason behind the military junta's intransigence has more to do with what they see as the danger of allowing international aid; a challenge to their legitimacy. Here, think of how the Bush administration's handling of Katrina led to his losing the trust and support of the majority of the population in the United States. In an authoritarian dictatorship, the loss would be even more crippling as they already have problems with legitimacy to begin with, and far worst than just a disputed election.

Eddie at Hidden Unities argues that given that "the credibility of the international human rights regime and the concept of 'responsibility to protect' is an at all time low, this catastrophe presents an opportunity to rehabilitate it. Not only that, but it would also help rehabilitate the value of "coalitions of the willing" which any action would have to be, given the fact that both Russia and China would veto any action through the UN Security Council. Still, he argues that these countries, along with India, Singapore and Thailand could be embarrassed into participating in one way or another, since the threat of force by a large coalition would force them to pressure the junta a lot more to accept international aid. He ends by arguing that "the concept of waging personal war against dictators and tyrants is one that should be further explored by governments and interested groups." This is in line with Thomas Barnett's theory, which calls for taking out those regimes which are so devoid of being rehabilitated, examples of which he cites as North Korea, and Zimbabwe. Eddie, argues that given the current reality, Myanmar's (Burma's) military junta is a good candidate. Eddie, however, does not argue for bringing democracy to the country, but suggests that even a junta controlled by Beijing, but which is actually competent would be preferable to the status quo.

Applebaum and Kaplan essentially make the same argument, that given the current situation the lesser of the two evils is to intervene with force, not necessarily to topple the military junta, but to deliver aid to the areas where it is needed. Kaplan even suggests that the US navy, which currently is holding exercises in Thailand, could enter the Irrawaddy Delta delivering aid from ships, with a small military footprint on the shore to reduce the likelihood of a military engagement with the military of Myanmar/Burma. Following this, Kaplan rightly recognizes that such an operation may hasten the collapse of the country's government, leaving the US and the international community dealing with not only a humanitarian crisis, but also a country which has historically led with various insurgent movements by various minority ethnic groups fighting against largely Burman controlled governments. Kaplan ends his piece by stating:

It seems like a simple moral decision: help the survivors of the cyclone...Sending in marines and sailors is the easy part; but make no mistake, the very act of our invasion could land us with the responsibility for fixing Burma afterward.

Indeed, as noted above, many of these bloggers, pundits and government officials base their arguments on the UN recognized R2P or Responsibility to Protect, which was adopted in 2005 partly due to remorse for the shortcomings exposed in the international community's failure to act during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990's.

The case is made even stronger by what Applebaum's argues is the Junta's overriding objective, its survival, at the cost of that of its own people. The crisis and number of dead so far, 60,000+, is only surpassed by the North Korean famine of 1995, which claimed the lives of as many as 3 million people. What makes matters worst is that according to recent news reports, not only is the military junta insisting that all aid go through the military, but also the fact that many aid groups are now complaining that the junta is in fact stealing aid meant for the victims, diverting it or warehousing it and not allowing it to reach those in need. As if all of this was not enough, to make you want to support forceful action, the economist reported last year that both Pyongyang and Russia were helping the military junta in Myanmar/Burma, in setting up a 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor in the country.

On the other side, it seems clear that the military junta is paranoid when it comes to outsiders, and it truly believes that any attempt to deliver aid using military vessels, such as has been suggested by Kaplan and others, is actually seen as a foreign invasion, and an attempt to topple the government. Hence, the voices calling for such action, rather than helping to build the trust of the junta, may actually be increasing their fears, and hence fueling their intransigence. This of course, is premised on them having ready access to the internet, particularly online papers such as the Washington Post, or the New York Times, if not other international media which no doubt have reported on these grumblings.

Dave Schuler, has a pretty good argument against intervening. Rather than summarizing it, I'll place a snippent here for your reference. To read the rest, please visit his site. Dave argues as follows

What argument can be made for coercive humanitarian aid in Burma that couldn’t have been made 20 years ago?

Is it the scale of the calamity? Following that logic we should have invaded China a dozen times over. Over the period of the last 60 years the Chinese government has killed a number of its own citizens greater than the total population of Burma. As had the Soviet Union.

Is it the lack of willingness of the ruling junta to accept aid? On that basis any number of governments including our own would justify invasion.

...Bad things happen. Our hearts go out to those who are suffering. The purpose of our military is to defend our country and its interests seen in a fairly narrow sense.

Must we go abroad in search of monsters to destroy? Where does it end?

Indeed, if we intervene in Burma/Myanmar, based on any of the factors mentioned above, it does open the door to other types of intervention that would further undermine the principle of state sovereignty, something which given most of the third worlds history of colonialism, many are loathe to support. This is part of what explains South Africa's opposition to the violation of state sovereignty, be it in Burma/Myanmar or Zimbabwe. To be sure, economic interests play a huge role as both India and China want to enlarge ports in Burma/Myanmar to increase their access to its oil wealth. This while Thailand wants to tap its lumber industry and Singapore wants to continue providing for its banking needs.

The US, and those members of the international community that care about this, can indeed put pressure on the regime through attacking their bank accounts, as Eddie suggested, or even waving the possibility of trial and judgment by the ICC for crimes against humanity. However, what is exposed in all this is the lack of a mechanism for processing failed states. Tom Barnett has written extensively on this at his blog and in Blueprint for Action and summarized here courtesy of the SecondLife Future Salon blog.

China, India and Russia would have to be part of this system, it cannot work without them, but before they can accept it, they need to be sold on its need and the opportunities it presents.

However, that is something to address at the theoretical level. In Burma, Myanmar the suffering now is real. It remains to be seen, how the recent earthquake in China will affect its posture vis a vis Burma. After all, if China's nationals have the right to expect that their government will do everything it can to bring aid to them following such a catastrophe, why shouldn't the Burmese people have the right to expect the same from their own government, or the international community?

For now, the international community continues to beg the military junta in Myanmar/Burma to allow more international aid in, and so far that is all its limited to. Meanwhile, the Burmese population continues to wait, for aid that may never come, and if it does, may come too late.

So what is the answer to the question in the title of this post? As a neo-Barnettist, I can get behind the push for an armed humanitarian intervention, but only if we can have more players (like France, China and India) to help us carry the load, and with the caveat that we work toward creating a regime for dealing with these failed states in the future. Still, as Dave Schuler argues, we also need to address the very real problems that such an intervention would create, in terms of how we deal with the implications of our actions. After all, the US is stretched thin as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can ill afford to get caught in another low-intensity conflict, particularly with China on the opposing end. Watching the suffering, it's hard not to be for intervening, and fast, but as they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Other links of interest

Security Dilemmas: To Send Aid Or Not To Send Aid, That Is The Question

Looks at how aid allows the junta to remain in power, hence the question of whether or not to send aid.

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The aftermath in Bolivia

Following the referendum vote in Santa Cruz, and with at least three more autonomy referendums looming in June, the Bolivian legislature and President Morales have opted for even more elections. This time, however, in the form of a recall vote for President Morales, and every state governor in Bolivia, including the Governor of Santa Cruz, who led the efforts in support of the autonomy vote. There is one twist, however, in order to stay in office the President and the governors would have to exceed the vote they garnered in the 2005 election. For Morales, this means that in order to stay in office, he would need to win more than 54% percent of the vote. If, for example, the President looses the recall, nothing prevents him from running during the election to replace him. In such a scenario, he would be the heavy favorite, even without attaining 54% of the vote. Such an outcome, however, would weaken his position in terms of legitimacy within the state.

President Morales had proposed the recall vote five months ago, as he battled with the more conservative governors over the direction of the country. The referendum had languished in the legislature until May 7 when it was approved. The opposition claims this referendum was passed, not only as an attempt to weaken President Morales (whom analysts expect to win) but also to prevent him from moving forward with a referendum on the new constitution, which many people in the lowlands of the country oppose. According to them, the national government can only hold one referendum a year, and they believe a recall referendum was preferable to having the new constitution forced through. The government disputes this, and believes that they can act on the constitutional referendum as well.

MABB blog says that while opposition governors in Santa Cruz, Pando, Tarija and Beni are relatively secure, opposition governors in Cochabamba, La Paz and Chuquisaca may be in trouble, because their constituency is heavily pro-MAS (Morales' party), hence it will be harder for them to replicate, much less exceed their 2005 victory results. Of particular concern for some of the governors is the provision that says that although President Morales, if he loses the referendum would stay in office for 90 days, until a new President was elected, the governors who lose would have to abandon their offices immediately, and would be replaced by a Presidential appointee, potentially giving Morales an important victory even as he has to contend with a new election for his office. According to the Democracy Center, despite this, most of the governors have expressed their support for the recall vote.

The recall referendum is scheduled now for August 10 of this year. It remains to be seen how things develop in the country. An up tick in violence is expected, not a full scale civil war, but something more along the lines of what happened during the autonomy vote in Santa Cruz. As some of you may remember, President Chavez in Venezuela went through a similar process. At the end of the recall there, he emerged with more power than before. It remains to be seen whether the same will be true in Bolivia. You can bet, President Chavez, will not only be watching, but will also actively support President Morales.

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The different levels of strategy, and Iraq

At Arms and Influence, Kingdaddy has an excellent post on the different levels of strategy. He uses a recent CNN interview with Joe Lieberman to illustrate what is wrong with the manner in which many Americans see Iraq today, including presidential candidate, Sen. John McCain. During his interview with CNN, Sen. Lieberman while disputing Kyra Phillip's assertion that many Iraqis don't want another Republican president in the White House, said this:

...there will be genocide and bloodshed, and Iran and al Qaeda will win, and we'll loose.

According to Kingdaddy,

For sake of argument, let's agree with Lieberman. We leave, and Iran and Al Qaeda "win." (That's not necessarily true, especially for Al Qaeda, but let's not get off track.) By implication, the United States loses. But what did we lose?

Kindaddy argues that it is important to separate the different levels of strategy: Grand strategic, theater, operational, tactical, and technical, because "success at one level does not necessarily bring success at all the others" likewise, failure in one theater does not necessarily bring failure at all the others. With regard to Iraq, he argues

If the United States were to lose one part of its theater strategy for the Middle East, it does not portend a cataclysm for the United States in that region, or for the most recently added priority in American grand strategy, counterterrorism.

The United states may have to contain the consequences of occupation and withdrawal, but there are several outcomes that may be eminently tolerable for the United States. The Iraqi factions are likely to remain focused on each other, not the United States. Iran may gain power and influence within Iraq, but exactly how does this automatically translate into a catastrophic loss for the United States? Freed from the Iraq trap, the United States might be able to do more in the Middle East overall, instead of pouring more blood and treasure into a single country. Americans might live in less danger of terrorist attack, if the American occupation no longer inspires outrage against the United states.

As a means of understanding this let's look back at the British Empire in the late 1700's. In 1775 the American colonies declared themselves independent of the British Crown. For the next eight years the British expended blood and treasure to bring the American colonists back under the fold. Due to their superior naval strength, they were able to take over most coastal cities in America, but were unable to take the countryside, due to their small land army (in comparison to the landmass they had to control). In 1778, after the American victory at Saratoga, France signed a treaty of alliance with the new American republic and declared war on Britain later that summer. In the next two years, Spain and the Dutch also declared war on Britain. The war expanded from one between the British Crown and thirteen of its colonies, to a worldwide struggle for the empire. The French and Spanish attacked the British throughout the West Indies, and Gibraltar. The French also began to contest the control of India with the help of their allies in the Kingdom of Mysore (Southern India).

As if this was not enough, by 1781 French involvement made itself felt in the American colonies and was instrumental in the British defeat at Yorktown in that year. By 1783, the colonial war for independence was over. Freed from having so much of its military might occupied by a colonial uprising and though grudgingly accepting defeat, the British moved to reinforce their position at Gibraltar and other theaters, including India and the West Indies. The British were so successful in repositioning their forces, that not only did they retain control of India and Gibraltar, but by the end of the war they had returned the West Indies to the status quo ante, with Britain as the preeminent power in the region. In this instance, it is clear that the British defeat on American soil, far from being cataclysmic, actually allowed it to commit its forces to regions were they could have an impact. In fact, after 1783 trade between the United States and Britain grew overwhelmingly and continued to do so, until the War of 1812.

I'm not a scholar on the war of Independence, and relied heavily for this post on wikipedia, so if anyone finds any historical inaccuracies please alert me to them, and I will correct them at once. Also, this post is not arguing that we are losing in Iraq, though this blogger believes that unless more radical changes take place within the country, it is hard to see how we can win (at least in the manner defined by this administration). The post is only meant to highlight the most important points brought forth by Kingdaddy at Arms and Influence, while also providing one more example of how a defeat in one theater, does not necessarily mean a defeat for our global strategy.

In short, we need to move beyond the myopic view of win/lose with regard to Iraq, and focus more profoundly on what we need to do to correct our strategy and succeed in defeating the more potent threats we face in this misnamed global war on terror, while also managing the global order we underpin. We can't have that discussion until many on the right stop simplifying the Iraq war to slogans of win-lose, appeasers vs. patriots, etc. In like manner, we also need to move beyond what has become the slogan for many on the left "McCain wants 100 yrs of war." He does not, he merely compared the American presence in Iraq (at least how he would like to see it) to that of South Korea, Germany and Japan. That is, he looks forward to a time when the United States will have troops in Iraq, not fighting insurgents or militias, but merely as a guarantee of allegiance and aid for the government of Iraq. Can you attack him for wishful thinking, perhaps, but to dumb down a legitimate difference of viewpoint (that Iraq can achieve such stability) to the simplistic slogan noted above is not helpful to anyone, or our need to truly debate what it is we are going to do moving forward.

Here's the full version of what Sen. Lieberman said. The statement referenced in this post, and Kingdaddy's comes near the end of the interview. The video itself is from ThinkProgress, hence my rant above on moving away from sloganeering as they once again repeat the strawman attack that McCain wants us in Iraq for 100yrs of war.

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US military: Head of al Qaeda in Iraq has not been captured

Sometimes, a little sarcasm goes a long way. The most appropriate headline for the news reports that surfaced yesterday on the "capture of the head of al Qaeda in Iraq comes to us courtesy of FARK.com.

The head of al Qaeda in Iraq who has reportedly been killed three times, captured twice, mortally wounded once is apparently free again.

As commenter Kilo at Abu Muqawama's blog aptly put it, he's the " fkn roadrunner." Beep, beep.

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The Castro family tree and an update on Cuba

On friday, FP Passport had a very interesting post on how the Castro family has spread its tentacles throughout the Cuban government. Once you realize how many Castro's are involved, you'll see why those who used to say that the regime in Cuba would fall with the death of Fidel Castro, were sorely mistaken. They are part of the military, the security forces and the Communist party, making them a significant force in the country's political and economic life.

This post, however, will not focus on the Castro family tree, but rather will be a sort of catch-up post on what's been going on in the island since my last post on the subject.

Raul Castro officially ascended to the Presidency of Cuba on February 28 of this year, he has instituted a series of reforms that have strengthened his political standing, quashing doubts about a post Fidel Cuba. Not only has Raul lifted bans on electric appliances, such as microwaves and computers, but also has lifted the ban on people owning cell phones. To be sure, given the low wages in Cuba, around $20/month some of these luxuries, though no longer prohibited by the government, will still be out of reach of the average citizen. However, the reforms, though gradual seem to be pointing toward a new direction for Cuba.

More recently, the government has also made it easier for private farmers and cooperatives to use, though not own, uncultivated government land. It has also made it easier for farmers to purchase equipment and supplies at government stores. According to the AP article, linked to above, Raul is an admirer of the free-market reforms pursued by China and Vietnam that allowed them to move away from Communism, even as they maintained single party control.

Raul has also lifted the hotel ban on Cuban citizens, which prevented them from entering tourists resorts on the island. Though many commentators scuffed at the reform, stating that given the low wages in Cuba, no Cuban citizen would be able to afford to stay at these resorts, they missed, perhaps the most important consequence of the lifting of the ban. Since many Cubans cannot afford computers at home, nor an internet connection, lifting the ban removed one of the biggest obstacles for Cuban bloggers to post their thoughts about the island online. In October of last year, the NY Times and IHT posted an article on anonymous Cuban bloggers who had to pretend to be tourists, in order to be able to blog secretly from the country's resorts. One such blogger was Yoani Sanchez, from her blog GeneracionY. Since the reforms, she now blogs openly and is even stopped in the streets by Cuban fans. Though the government accuses her of taking money from opposition groups, other than slow connection speeds, they have not really done much to stop her from blogging. In fact, she was recently named one of the world's 100 most influential people by Time Magazine.

She is one of a growing network of Cuban cyber-rebels who are defying the state's limits. Using memory sticks, digital cameras and clandestine internet connections they have challenged the government by spreading news it has tried to suppress. For example, when the government tried to impose a tax on tips and wages of employees of foreign companies, workers when told via cell phone of the proposal erupted against the measure. The government, according to the NYTimes has been hard pressed to control internet access as there is a thriving black market for these services. It is particularly difficult for the government since many times, government employees sell their government usernames and passwords so that people can access the internet in the middle of the night. The article further notes, that

Even the country’s top computer science school, the University of Information Sciences, set in a campus once used by Cuba’s spy services, has become a hotbed of cyber-rebels. Students download everything from the latest American television shows to articles and videos criticizing the government, and pass them quickly around the island.

All in all, despite the fact that the Castro's continue running Cuba, and that nepotism has spread them wide across the country's political and security institutions, there are some positive developments as a result of the reforms commenced by Raul. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Cuban state will continue to allow the thriving black market for internet connections or if it will crackdown and seek to restrict access once again. So far, the government seems to be loosing the battle, and as Tom Barnett has pointed out with regard to China, connectivity always wins.

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