In remembrance...

Today and tomorrow mark the 1 year anniversary of my cousin's death. This past January I wrote about it on this blog, explaining my absence from blogging for the period of October 22, 2006 to January 12, 2007.

I say that today and tomorrow mark the first anniversary of her death for two reasons. First, she died on the 22nd of October of last year, hence tomorrow will be a year to the date. However, last year the 22nd fell on a Sunday, a day much like today, so in that sense, today also marks a year since her death. As I wrote last year, her death came as a surprise to all of us. She had been battling cancer since early March, going through chemo treatments every two weeks. I would always call her every week after her treatment, because I knew that following the chemo, she was always too weak to talk or do anything for about 3 to 4 days. By late August, she was well on her way to a full recovery. Since July, her doctor had told her that her cancer appeared to be in full remission and that if things continued she would be able to stop her chemo treatments far earlier than he had imagined.

She hated being sick. I mean, who doesn't, but her reason for hating it was because it prevented her from completing her degree and getting her doctor's license. So many times she would tell me, "I'm a doctor. I should be taking care of others, not convalescing in this bed." I would tell her that she needed to take care of herself, complete her chemo and recuperate, so that she could do exactly that. I also told her that she should look at her sickness as an opportunity to see what it was like to be a patient, so that she could empathize more readily with her own patients once she was practicing her craft. She liked it when I told her that, because it made her sickness seem not so much an impediment, but from her point of view, a lesson in her own medical training. She told me it gave her purpose, even as she anticipated the day when she would be healthy enough to go back to school and complete her final year of residency before getting her license to practice.

In late August, the doctor told her that the cancer appeared to have been killed as the tests did not show a single cancer cell in her body. He prescribed her rest, but told her she should be able to return to her studies soon. She was elated as she wanted nothing more than to return and complete her last year of residency at the hospital. That was in August, and yet by October 22 of that same year, she was dead.

Today, I've been thinking about her a lot. So much so that I avoided calling my aunt and uncle today not only because I knew that they would be busy with arrangements for her one year anniversary mass, but also because a part of me wanted to avoid hearing them or my cousins cry. At least until tomorrow. It was not to be.

When my phone rang today, I immediately felt my emotions welling up inside of me, because all I could think of was the phone call I received a little after 5 pm one year ago, the same day I wrote this post. As I talked to my parents, and my cousins I remembered that conversation, and how once I hung up I immediately went online and purchased a plane ticket to be there for her funeral. I left at 6 am on Monday morning, and arrived there at 12 pm. My cousins (her brother being one of them) along with my father came to pick me up at the airport. I came out of the gate towards the street and saw them immediately. Both my cousins walked up to me, we hugged and started crying, with her brother telling me "she's gone. she's gone." We walked in silence to the car and drove to the funeral home. There, the emotions were almost too much to bear with so many family members overflowing from the funeral home, my aunt sitting close to the coffin, with my little cousin and my uncle, almost as if waiting, hoping that my cousin would open her eyes and get up.

Speaking to my parents today brought back so many memories and yet we spoke in general terms trying not to delve too much into the reason for the call, or how it reminded me of the same call as detailed above. I spoke with my cousin (her brother) briefly. It was obvious from our first words, that the pain had not abated much since then. We said a few words and then he gave the phone back to my mother. The emotion was just too much. Next, I spoke with my little cousin (her sister) and almost immediately following "Hello" she broke down in tears. The pain of her crying was almost too much. It brought back so vividly the pain of my cousin's funeral and burial, when I had to drag my little cousin away so that they could lower the coffin in its final resting place. She didn't want to let go, she was crying, almost screaming, "Sis, wake up! Get up! Don't go!" My aunt was too distraught, as was my uncle whose eulogy left not a single dry eye in that cemetery. Her brother by this time was beyond consolation, and none could bear to see my little cousin thrown over the coffin any more. Many of us moved to grab her, but since I was the closest, I got there first. I tried initially to talk to her, to get her to get up on her own. She did not. I gently tried to prod her, but all that did was to get her to wrap herself more tightly, her tears pouring over the coffin that was to be her sister's final resting place. Eventually, my father and uncle made a gesture telling me to take her from there. I had to use a little more strength, and eventually once I was able to get a hold of both her arms, I was able to pick her up and away from her sister's grave. By that time, I had joined her as tears ran down my face. We stayed watching as the grave diggers began to lower the coffin and as they poured dirt to cover the grave. Slowly, a few people began to walk away and towards their cars. It began to rain. As raindrops fell, we began to slowly walk back to our own cars. Our only consolation, was that my cousin was buried in the same grave as her grandmother (her final wish), grandfather and other relatives who now call that part of the cemetery, home.

Tonight I re-live those two days once again, part of the time in sadness, the other less so, particularly as I remember the time we spent together, from our early childhood, right up to the last years of her life when we saw each other far less than I would have liked. She was an incredible individual, driven and strong, quick witted and hilarious, and above all beautiful. Words alone can't do her justice. She was grander than life itself and fought to the end for that life she loved so much.

The memory I have of her as I write this, is of the last time I saw her, she was dressed all in white, with a white cap covering her bald head. She looked like an angel in her peaceful and eternal sleep, all she needed were wings.

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Blasts from the past: Alberto Fujimori and the Shinning Path of Peru

Sendero Luminoso (Shinning Path), the Peruvian Maoist guerrilla left for dead almost a decade ago is stirring with new life in Peru. At a time when former president and one time dictator, Alberto Fujimori (who is credited with the demise of the Shinning Path insurgency) is being brought to trial for human rights violations and corruption during his tenure in office, there is fear that Sendero may be in the initial phase of re-kindling its violent campaign against the Peruvian state, aided by profits from the drug trade.

Following Fujimori's unsuccessful bid to capture a seat in Japan's Upper House this past July and after 22 months residing in Chile, that country's Supreme Court ruled in September that he be extradited to Peru to face the charges mentioned above. The first of his trials is scheduled to start on November 26 where he will face charges of murder and kidnapping. If convicted of the charges, which include the 1992 death squad murders of 9 students and a professor at a Peruvian University, the killing of 15 people at a Lima neighborhood and charges that he ordered the kidnapping of a prominent journalist and businessman, Fujimori faces up to 30 years in prison and a fine of $33 million.

Though he returns to a different Peru than the one he left, Fujimori still has many supporters. Already, this past September, upon his return to Peru over 1,000 of his supporters rallied in the streets of Lima, clamoring for his release. In Peru, it is estimated that up to 20 percent of the population still support him, with 35 percent believing he still has a political future in the country. His daughter, who is currently a member of the Peruvian Congress, claims that the government is trying to prevent his supporters from showing their true strength, and of mistreatment of her father. While the few hundred supporters that showed up at the airport when he returned, seems to contradict her statement that he still has vast support, Fujimoristas remain a powerful force within the country. In fact, current President Alan Garcia and his party have allied themselves with Fujimoristas to obtain a majority government. Despite this however, opponents of Fujimori are substantial. In the last election, Ollanta Humala, who led a coup attempt against Fujimori captured 47 percent of the vote, being narrowly defeated by Alan Garcia.

Although Fujimori's return has caused a lot of turmoil, and will continue to cause it for the foreseeable future, the country seems to be moving forward economically, growing at 7 percent annually, this, in large part thanks to the booming trade in mineral exports. It is also likely to improve further following the U.S. Congress’ approval of Peru's Free Trade Agreement with the United States, which is expected to pass soon. That said, Peru still has many problems, high among which is poverty. The country has an estimated 54 percent of its population below the poverty line. In addition, Peru is also second behind Colombia in the production of cocaine; both of which make for an explosive combination, more so where Sendero Luminoso is involved.

When Peruvian intelligence apprehended its leader, Abimael Guzman aka Presidente Gonzalo given the centralized structure of the movement, not to mention the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Shinning Path was seen in the early 1990s to be a spent force, defeated and in dire need of funds. However, much like their neighboring Marxist brethren in Colombia, Sendero turned to the one place where it could gain access to badly needed funding; the drug trade. Based in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the group has become not only a narco-terrorist organization, but also a criminal syndicate involved in everything from trafficking of drugs, to running a protection racket for peasants worried about the Peruvian government's coca eradication programs.

According to Frank Hyland, though the group is currently believed to have as few as 500 members (down from its high of 10,000 in the 1980's) its cooperation with organized crime in the country makes it a dangerous security threat to the Peruvian state. In fact, Peru’s National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (Devida, Spanish acronym) has already denounced the increase in attacks against coca eradication troops in the center of the country. So far, according to the Special Project for the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Huallaga (Corah) there have been 87 attacks, 48 of which were booby traps left in coca fields and which have resulted 13 government eradication troops being injured. Peru’s government blames Sendero, as it argues that coca farmers don’t have the access or expertise to craft such weapons.

Moreover, the Peruvian government during a series of anti-terrorism raids, recently captured 12 members of the group, in addition to 8 people, among them current and former military members of Peru’s military, whom it claimed were involved in providing weapons to the FARC in Colombia. In addition, the raids also resulted in the capture of documents revealing information about Sendero’s strength and capabilities. Some of these documents also detailed how social conflicts in Peru, as well as cocalero dissatisfaction with the government’s eradication program have helped to reinvigorate and swell its ranks. Demonstrating the extent of the problem, the Peruvian government has extended the State of Emergency it declared in six provinces in the northeast of the country, a State of Emergency that dates back to December 2005 when 13 policemen were killed in attacks attributed to Sendero in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the Apurimac river.

Peru’s government is taking the threat posed by Sendero seriously and its main anti-terrorism unit, Dircote is actively engaged in tracking, and capturing its leadership. Currently, it is believed that Sendero’s leader is Camarada Artemio, who is based in the Upper Huallaga Valley, Sendero’s main stronghold. Throughout this year, Dircote has captured and killed some of Sendero’s mid-level operatives leading to a wealth of information on the groups activities, including the real identity of other mid-level operatives in the organization. Despite these successes, however, the threat remains very real.

In 2006, drug cultivation in Peru increased almost 7 percent. This, despite the fact that the eradication of coca crops also increased about 4 percent from the previous year. Demand for cocaine and heroin have increased, specifically due to growing demand in China where a kilo of cocaine can earn up to $150,000. According to this article, the EU has surpassed the U.S. as the main consumer of Peruvian cocaine, however, this is mostly due to the fact that the U.S. main supplier is Colombia via Mexico. More troubling is the fact that these same Mexican cartels (Tijuana, Sinaloa, Juarez and del Golfo) are also responsible for the majority of the cocaine traffic emanating from Peruvian ports to Central America, the E.U., U.S., Asia and Africa. As if this was not enough, Peruvian cartels are also emerging who no longer depend on the Mexican or Colombian cartels for export and distribution of the drugs, further increasing the potential for instability in the country.

Demonstrating the effects of the drug trade on the country, the article also details how bankers, accountants, lawyers and other professionals in Peru are complicit in laundering money from the drug trade. Additionally, it is speculated that up to 16 tons of Peru’s drug production remains in the country for internal consumption leading to a marked increase in the social ills that consumption brings. Recently, following the 15th anniversary of the capture of Presidente Gonzalo, Sendero issued a statement in which it re-stated its commitment to continue with the armed struggle and its goal of replacing the Peruvian government. Hyland noted in September, that Sendero's strength was growing in Peru's Ayacucho region "including armed forays and patrols into more distant locations." This argument, is supported by reports from the Peruvian press, who note that in recent months Sendero has attempted to infiltrate areas outside of its control. So far, people in these areas have resisted, and have asked the Peruvian government to provide them with additional police forces and naval patrols to counter the threat. Tellingly, these incursions are into towns and villages already surrounded by coca and marijuana cultivation fields, further tying Sendero to the drug trade.

Sendero no longer attempts to recruit the population to its cause by using its violent tactics (like in the 1980s) instead choosing to lure them to its side with the economic benefits that accrue it from the drug trade. In doing so, they take advantage of the high poverty rate mentioned above. In short, a cycle has developed where farmers seeking additional revenue begin coca cultivation, seeking out Sendero for protection from the government's eradication efforts. In providing security for these cocaleros, and charging for its services, Sendero is essence becomes a government within a government and only then begins its proselytizing and indoctrination to its cause.

Additionally, according to this article, there is evidence that Sendero not only protects coca fields from government eradication, but is also actively engaged in its cultivation, processing and trafficking.

In May 2006, Peru's national police captured members of Sendero based in the Huallaga Valley. Among these was a lieutenant close to Camarada Artemio, who provided the police with information on Sendero's illicit business activities, including the aforementioned racketeering, safe houses and its role in the execution of rival cartel members. The trove of information from these captured Senderistas almost led to the capture of Camarada Artemio himself, who barely escaped a raid in which part of his security detail was captured. However, though his capture would strike a blow to the organization, it will not leave Sendero as weak and leaderless as the capture of Presidente Gonzalo, since the group has decentralized its leadership structure and divided itself into separate sub-commands that can continue the struggle independently. As such, Sendero will, for the foreseeable future remain a potent threat.

Perhaps more troubling that even Sendero or Fujimori's return is something that has gotten very little press. This is the establishment of what are called "casas de ALBA" literally, "houses of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" or what is now commonly referred to as Chavismo. According to Diario Correo, these centers have begun appearing throughout Peru, under the guises of centers of Cuban-Peruvian, Cuban-Venezuelan-Peruvian or Venezuelan-Peruvian friendship. Importantly, these houses/centers have been established in areas of Lima (the capital) and in regions throughout the country, that have traditionally been receptive to anti-establishment messages and which during the height of the Sendero insurgency where considered "red zones." So far, there is no evidence of cooperation between these houses/centers and Sendero, in fact they seem to be at odds since they are competing for the same constituency. Still, since Hugo Chavez supported Humala in the last election, the establishment of these houses/centers seems to suggest a strategy for a future presidential contest based on building a grass roots movement for a bolivarian revolution in Peru. While I don't believe that Chavez is strong enough, and that our focus on his antics most of the time aids and feeds his egotism more than anything else, given the state of the Peruvian state, I thought it important to highlight their appearance.

Peru, although seemingly improving economically still has many problems that it needs to address. Poverty being a priority, since it provides fertile ground for Sendero, the drug trade and even Chavismo to grow as threats to the Peruvian state. However, it also remains to be seen what impact, if any Fujimori's return will have on the country. Particularly if Sendero does indeed step up its violent campaign to Lima and other parts of the country, as it did during the 1980's and 90's. Since Fujimori is widely credited with the demise of Sendero, such a move by Sendero could increase support for him, at a time when the government is trying to prosecute him, perhaps giving him the room he needs to not only beat the charges, but also to return to Peru's political life. That said, a lot would need to happen for that to come to pass.

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AFRICOM and the balance of power in Africa

This month saw the official launch of AFRICOM as a subcommand of European Command, with a view to completing its transition as a separate command by October 2008. I posted earlier this year on the trouble AFRICOM was having in finding a home on the continent. Since then, the situation has gotten better but the US will have to navigate regional politics in order to secure basing rights on the continent.

As recent as a couple of weeks ago, Nigeria made it known that it was discussing, with members of the African Union and ECOWAS, different means of blocking any attempt by the US to set up a base in the Gulf of Guinea. In like manner, South Africa's Defense Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota also issued a statement saying that additional U.S. troops were not welcomed in the continent, adding that this was the unanimous position of the Southern African Development Community, which is made up of fourteen African countries. Additionally, he threatened any African country willing to base American military forces with the consequences of their actions, implying a cooling of relations with its African neighbors. This was perceived by many to be directed at those few countries that have already stated an interest in housing Africa Command. Among these are Liberia, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Gabon, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and possibly Botswana, which recently disclosed discussions with South Africa and the US regarding AFRICOM. This revelation, however, was made two weeks ago and prior to Defense Minister Lekota's statement on the issue.

There are many reasons for the resistance to the hosting of AFRICOM bases in the continent. These range from those mentioned in other posts, such as the fear that hosting an AFRICOM station would make the host country a likely target for al Qaeda operations, to fear of the influence the US would be able to exert within the host country itself and the region due to its military presence. This, without mentioning the perception (in large part thanks to US support for Ethiopia's operations in Somalia) that AFRICOM will result in the complete militarization of American Foreign Policy in Africa; its creation already being seen as the official arrival of the Global War on Terror in the continent.

The US, seeking to quell some of these fears, has repeatedly emphasized that AFRICOM, more than anything is about "the four Ps and the three Ds: Prevention of conflict, promotion of regional stability, protection of American and African interests and prevailing against the rise of extremism through diplomacy, development and defense. The problem, of course, is that the CJTF-Horn of Africa was described in the same way, and that image was shattered by the US government's endorsement of Ethiopia's actions in Somalia, followed by the use of American military force in the country. As argued in an earlier post on this subject, I noted (citing Tom Barnett's Esquire article) that American actions in Somalia "damaged the positive presence that the CJTF-Horn of Africa had worked so hard to establish" there.

In that same piece, also noting Barnett's observation regarding the reasons behind Djibouti's decision to host the CJTF-Horn of Africa, I argued that there would be other African nations who would likely step up to host AFRICOM for similar reasons; in this case, as a check on regional hegemons, such as Nigeria and South Africa. This more than anything, explains these countries’ efforts to block the establishment of AFRICOM bases in their respective regions, and can be seen as attempts to prevent the rise of a countervailing force to their power. The map below provides a clearer picture of this:

Map edited by NYkrinDC, from the original at Stratfor.

As can be seen from the map above, which details the regional interests of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia and U.S. AFRICOM, there is some overlap. This is particularly true of Nigeria and the US. Nigeria already sees itself as the purveyor of security in the region, and perceives the establishment of an AFRICOM base in the Gulf of Guinea region, as an attempt by the U.S. to displace it. Nigeria's fear is not unfounded, as in 2002, the US declared West African oil as a strategic asset, one the US would use military force to protect.

The U.S. has sought to address these concerns by stressing that AFRICOM's "foremost mission is to help Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on terrorism or secure African resources." The U.S. has argued that it will do this by strengthening Africa's multilateral institutions, which of late, have been playing a greater role in the continent's security affairs. Indeed, one of the U.S.'s biggest selling points is that Africa Command will be different from the other Commands in that it "will be staffed by a large number of State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development members, including a senior foreign service officer to serve as the military commander’s civilian deputy." However, an American base, regardless of American intentions will change the power dynamic in the region, or anywhere such a base or bases are finally established, because they allow a new player on the proverbial poker table, with deep pockets and the guns to match. Even so, the U.S. does have a case for, in Barnettian terms, exporting security to the Gulf of Guinea region. As has been documented in various articles throughout the last couple of years, Nigeria has been unable to deal with militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, leaving many offshore oil platforms vulnerable to attacks and hijackings from these forces, who seek a re-allocation of oil revenue emanating from the Delta, but largely controlled and spent outside of it. The U.S. rightly argues that an additional naval presence would provide greater security to the region from pirates, insurgents and smugglers who prey on offshore oil facilities. As if that were not enough, Nigeria is also having to contend with Liberia's President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who has sought to remake the country into the US's largest supporters in the region.

In like manner, South Africa also fears an encroaching U.S. presence in Southern Africa, as a result of Robert Mugabe and the crisis in Zimbabwe. In recent years, as South Africa's internal politics have stabilized, the country has sought to reclaim its role as the South African regions' hegemon. An American base in Southern Africa, would upset these plans for the reasons mention above with regard to Nigeria. Already South Africa has been working on creating a Southern Africa Development Community peace-keeping force to handle the continents many problem zones. It has also purchased advanced weapons from Europe and the US to consolidate its military power.

While many of the overlapping interest zones are a source of tension between South Africa and Nigeria on the one hand, and the new U.S. Africa Command on the other, there are also many opportunities for cooperation. One such place is in the rapidly deteriorating situation in DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, where not only South Africa, but also the US have a role to play in preventing the outbreak of a third major war. For South Africa, the trouble there is two fold as it sees Angola possibly influencing events in the DR Congo and Zimbabwe in a manner unfavorable to South Africa's long-term interests. Additionally, Nigeria can benefit from an increased American naval presence in the area, to reduce the space in which MEND and oil smugglers have to function in the region.

The U.S. has announced that Africa Command will be divided among six different bases, so tensions between the US and regional African powers is likely to increase as the US prepares to for the launch of AFRICOM as a stand-alone Command. The task will not be easy, and will become more difficult the more protracted and chaotic the situation in Somalia becomes, as this is seen rightly or wrongly, as AFRICOM's first test, and as a harbinger of things to come.

Still, there are some positive signs of talks between the parties. In the following months, Nigeria's Defense Ministry will be sending a delegation to Washington to discuss AFRICOM, and we can expect a similar move on the part of South Africa. Ethiopia, for its part, has already acceded to an American presence in its region under the CJTF-HOA. These discussions, and how the U.S. addresses the issues raised by the Southern and Western hegemons will likely determine whether and how the U.S. establishes bases on the continent. The U.S. has already sought to strengthen its position by increasing military aid and weapons' sales to oil rich nations and friendly states. This means that with or without Nigerian or South African acquiescence, the bases will be established.

That said, one of the earliest proponents of such a Command, Thomas Barnett, has argued against establishing any AFRICOM headquarters in Africa proper, and instead has called for establishing those headquarters state-side to serve as a nascent Department of Everything Else or SysAdmin, while letting SOCOM handle any kinetic actions deemed necessary in the continent. Barnett calls for re-creating the CJTF-HOA in Africa's South, West and Central regions. As noted from above, given the CJTF-HOA's bad rep resulting from Somalia, this may prove difficult. Still, it is an interesting idea, and an alternative to trying to network AFRICOM's headquarters from six distinct bases, not to mention the Navy's alternate proposal, "to house AFRICOM on a high tech joint command and control ship that would circumnavigate the region."

As the fall of 2008 approaches, tensions with regional hegemons will likely rise over AFRICOM's future, and it remains to be seen whether they will acquiesce to welcoming an American presence or be forced to accept it by default. That will determine in large part AFRICOM's success, since cooperation between the Command and Africa's largest economic, military and political powers will be essential to addressing the continent's many problems.

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More on comedy and the war on terror, and on moving beyond it

It seems as if my post on the role of comedy in this War on Terror was timely. The New York Times published an article on Friday on Saudis rethinking of the taboo of letting women drive. (H/T Tom Barnett).

Barnett notes the different reasons for the Saudis' move with regard to this long held taboo; economics and connectivity. However, he also notes the role of Saudi Arabia's popular sitcoms,“Tash Ma Tash” (“No Big Deal” and “Amsha Bint Amash” (“Amsha, Daughter of Amash”), in preparing Saudi society for allowing women to drive. The use of comedy, or entertainment to acculturate a society to coming change is not something new, and is something we need to take note of as we look for better ways to fight this war on terror.

In his latest piece, Tom Friedman (H/T Tom Barnett) calls for this very rethinking on 9/11 and its after effects while also endorsing what he refers to as the 9/12 candidate or the candidate who moves beyond the anger, and fear, "a president who will unite us around a common purpose, not a common enemy."

He's right. The War on Terror needs to be reshaped, beginning with its name. We need to move away from promoting fear of terrorism, extremism, invasion, etc. In short, away from the largely kinetic mode we've been in during the last six years, and toward employing every aspect of our power, particularly the largely underutilized soft-power of diplomacy, and the universal appeal of our culture, both with regard to entertainment, as well as our values.

Does this mean that we just pretend that we no longer have any enemies? Of course not. As Friedman states,

"It is not that I thought we had new enemies that day and now I don’t. Yes, in the wake of 9/11, we need new precautions, new barriers. But we also need our old habits and sense of openness. For me, the candidate of 9/12 is the one who will not only understand who our enemies are, but who we are."

"Before 9/11, the world thought America’s slogan was: “Where anything is possible for anybody.” But that is not our global brand anymore. Our government has been exporting fear, not hope: 'Give me your tired, your poor and your fingerprints.'"

Barnett calls this the natural realignment we need. I agree. It is not that we don't continue fighting our enemies, but rather that we do it more intelligently. That means moving away from the rhetoric of Iraq as the pivot on which this GWOT will turn, toward a better understanding of the type of war we are actually fighting. It means recognizing that in Iraq we are engaging many different enemies, few of which actually have anything to do with Al Qaeda, hence we end up in a situation where we are spending too much blood, and treasure for too little gain.

Al Qaeda, as the president and others like to quote so