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Saturday, May 26, 2007

Adding dimension to the China debate

Given this weekend's release of the Pentagon's Report on China's Military Developments and the alarm with which they have been received by China hawks (hat tip Observing Japan), the summer 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly is timely and adds some context to the China debate.(hat tip CSIS Global Strategy Institute).

Much of the debate on China has been focused on this question: Why is China seeking to strengthen its military despite the apparent absence of direct threats from other nations? How you answer it, depends very much on your world view.

At Observing Japan we get a pretty good answer. Japan Observer, argues that "China's military thinking is consistent with every rising great power in history, even today, only military powers are taken seriously as great powers. Earlier in the post, he stated

"[A]s China becomes more wealthy, it is directing its wealth to its military, which will enable it to secure "press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes." Does anyone expect it to be otherwise? Even if China was a mature democracy, would it be any different? Once again, the comparison to the rise of the US is telling. As discussed in considerable detail by Robert Kagan in his Dangerous Nation, as the US grew wealthier over the course of the nineteenth century (with foreign trade no small part of US economic success), US interests abroad grew accordingly, and as interests grew, demands that the US have the military means to secure them grew accordingly (which led, of course, to a further expansion of US interests). China is not altogether different. Its interests are growing rapidly, and globally, leading it to desire a military to will be able to secure those growing interests."

This is a very good argument. Essentially, in an anarchic world order, this is what great powers do, power is fungible, so economic becomes military and that power governs relations between states. However, Japan observer does note, borrowing from Prof. Nye, that

"China's future is far from ordained, and much will depend on the decisions the US makes. As Joseph Nye and others have been saying for a long while, if the US acts rashly in the face of China's military modernization, it may well make fears of a hostile China a self-fulfilling prophecy."

Here I'll point out to Sean from Tom Barnett's weblog, that in this instance Japan Observer and Tom are on the same page. :)

Moving on. Prof. Paul Kennedy in an early April op-ed at the IHT (H/T Observing Japan) provided us with yet another dimension to the China debate. In that op-ed, Prof. Kennedy focused on the growing naval arms-race in Asia, and on the power shift in International Relations from the West (Europe w/o the U.S.) to the East (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and even Vietnam), that was occurring as a result.

In the op-ed, Prof. Kennedy tells us of his recent visit to South Korea, where he learned of South Korea's 15 year-plan for the expansion of its maritime power. According to him, South Korea is building 3 destroyers with very powerful armaments. More recently, again via Observing Japan's post linked above and Marmot's Hole, we learn that South Korea has become one of the few countries in the world to deploy an Aegis-equipped warship.

Citing the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007 report "The Military Balance," we also learn from Prof. Kennedy that Japan is "in the midst of an even greater naval build-up," as is Russia, and even Vietnam, which has increased its defense spending, including naval, in recent years. What is more relevant is that when questioned on their increasing defense spending, each country points to another's defense increases as a reason behind their own.

All of these articles, however, fail to mention the rise of yet another Asian power, one China went to war with in 1962; India. In "The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century," Prof. Jing Dong Yuan provides us with additional context in this China debate.

According to Prof. Yuan,

"Despite unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions over each other’s military buildup and strategic intent, potential economic competition, and the changing balance of power and realignments, China and India have enjoyed 10 years of mostly uninterrupted progress in their political, economic, and security relationship."


In fact, trade between the two countries has risen from $117 million in 1987 to $25 billion in 2006.

Despite this, however, Prof. Yuan tells us that while in the past China generally dismissed India as a possible peer competitor, now it increasingly takes India's rise into account in formulating Chinese regional and global policy. Of particular concern for Chinese analysts are the following:

  • India's defense modernization and growing economic clout

    India has increased spending on defense modernization and acquisition of weapons

    India is currently the fourth largest economy in the world and rapidly rising to third place

  • India's growing relationship with the U.S.

    Of particular concern is Washington's attempt to enlist New Delhi as a counterweight to China (this fear has been reduced due to the GWOT and the U.S. focus on cooperating with other great powers, particularly China, on terrorism and other matters)

    Joint U.S.-Indian military exercises, and regular defense consultation

    The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal of March 2006

  • India's relationship with Japan

    The two countries have now established the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership

  • India's growing relationship with ASEAN

    Many of whom have ongoing disputes with China

The above is of concern to China because of the ramifications India's strategy (as perceived by Beijing) could have for China. Prof. Yuan tells us that many Chinese analysts argue that "India is seeking to further consolidate its South Asian dominance and control of the Indian Ocean and to develop minimum but credible deterrence against China...Implicit in this strategy is also the need [for India] to balance China."

Adding to China's worries is also a report from Chatham House titled "India and West Africa: A Burgeoning Relationship" [PDF] (H/T Sushant Singh at IntelliBriefs). The paper details India's rising involvement in West Africa beyond its traditional Commonwealth partners, the increasing competition for energy resources between India, other Asian countries and the West, India's use of soft-power through "insights into agricultural expansion, clean water management and how to confront the threat of climate transformation."

As is apparent from the above, the current slew of debates on China's rise has only begun to scratch the surface of the many issues involved. Many times, it is viewed in a vacuum, as exemplified in the original question presented above when reality, as seen from the above, is so much more complex. The deeper we delve into this debate, the more apparent it becomes that one of the core assumptions made by Tom Barnett in his book, The Pentagon's New Map may be coming undone, at least as it relates to Asia. That assumption was that the U.S. has control of the world's oceans. As Asia rises, that assumption will not only be tested, but may be disprove. If anything, this realization should make it clear how important it is for us to move to a new security arrangement in Asia, or what Tom calls an Asian NATO that ties all of these disparate Asian players into a security compact that allows them to move from arms races to economic growth and connectivity with each other and the outside world.

Finally, I just wanted to provide links to other papers which came to my attention as I completed this post. The first is from Chatham House and deals with the same issue as Prof. Yuan's paper, the title is "China and India: Cooperation and Competition"[PDF]. Also, please look at the other articles in the current issue of The Washington Quarterly which has articles ranging from the above to others exploring India's balance between interests and values, its relationship with Iran, and the question of whether India will emerge as a responsible stakeholder of the world order. The current issue also looks at East Asian Integration and Its Implications for the United States, America’s Grand Design in Asia and The Tenuous hold of China Inc. in Africa. Lastly, I also wanted to link to a post by Tom Barnett who cited an article by Bill Gertz on how "China's growing importance to the U.S. as a trade partner undermines our security relationship with Japan."

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Thursday, May 24, 2007

More bad news: Opium now growing in Iraq

Just when you thought things could not get any worse in Iraq, we get this bit of news from The Independent. The report states that farmers in Diwaniya (southern Iraq) have begun shifting from the cultivation of rice (which the area is known for) to the cultivation of poppies. According to the article, while cultivation is in its early stages, there is little the central government, U.S. or British forces can do because Diwaniya is controlled by "Shia militias and their surrogates in the security forces."

In fact, the report argues that many of the bloody clashes between militiamen, the police, the Iraqi army and U.S. forces is a result of this shift. Moreover, violence has increased not only in Diwaniya but also in Basra, Nassariyah, Kut and elsewhere in Southern Iraq. The fighting has nothing to do with the surge, but rather is between rival militias, particularly the Mahdi army and the Badr organization (who controls the police forces). According to the article, the violence is directly related to control over profitable resources and bases of power, including the production of opium.

As if this were not enough, criminal gangs who already have networks operating in Iraq to transit heroin from Afghanistan and Iran though not yet involved pose a real risk of making the cultivation more organized. As in Afghanistan, for farmers the temptation is the same; more money is to be made from opium than from any other crop, including rice.

Depressing news to be sure, because even more than reducing the arable land for the production of legal goods and foodstuffs, once opium cultivation becomes more organized the militias will have a very important source of revenue to finance their activities. If this happens the militias will be self-sustaining, and that much harder to defeat. If we are going to stay in Iraq, as it seems we are planning to do given the victory handed to the president in the war funding battle, then we need to address this now, before it reaches the level of Afghanistan.

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Wednesday, May 23, 2007

A Mediterranean Union?

That is the proposal being put forth by the newly elected President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy. The proposed union would consist of sixteen southern European, Middle Eastern and North African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Lybia, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The union though primarily economic, would also involve member countries in discussions over controversial issues such as Turkey's EU membership, illegal immigration, counter-terrorism, energy security, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and would provide another forum where Israel and its Arab neighbors could participate together. Sarkozy has said that he wants the countries ringing the Mediterranean to form a council and hold regular summit meetings under a rotating presidency and envisions it as being a bridge between Europe and Muslim world.

While some countries have expressed guarded to full support for the proposal, Turkey has balked as it sees it as nothing more than a mechanism to keep Turkey out of the EU. This fear is not misplaced as keeping the EU closed to Turkey was part of Sarkozy's campaign platform. In fact, Sarkozy has argued in the past that Turkey has always been part of Asia Minor and not Europe. Earlier this week, I posted on the news that Sarkozy had appointed Bernard Kouchner as Foreign Minister, and brought up the possibility that this move could signal a change to his well known opposition to Turkey's entry to the EU. That possibility now seems more remote, since as Dr. Hadar argues, Sarkozy sees the MU as an viable alternative to Turkish membership in the EU.

According to the article, Sarkozy sees the MU working closely with the EU, eventually forming joint institutions, even as the organizations remain separate and distinct entities.

According to Dr. Hadar, (who has a more in depth article at the National Interest) the proposal is an extension of the 1995 EU sponsored Barcelona process which sought to bring 12 Mediterranean countries into a free-trade zone by 2010. This Barcelona initiative (aka Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) is currently the only forum where "Israel and Arab countries sit around the same table." Dr. Hadar also argues that Sarkozy's move away from France's old Arabist foreign policy makes sense because trade between Israel and the EU has increased threefold in the last decade. At the same time, the Middle East exports oil and thousands of poor, disgruntled immigrants which have become a demographic time bomb in the EU hence any policy aimed at removing the incentives to immigrate to the EU is seen as essential. As the IHT article points out, this is similar to the argument made in favor of NAFTA, mainly, "give them jobs where they are rather than having them come across the border. As many of you will no doubt point out, this didn't exactly work for us either. Notwithstanding, Dr. Hadar sees the MU as a positive thing for Turkey, because it would do for that country what NAFTA has done for Mexico, or accelerate trade and investment ties between the parties to the agreement. He argues that such interaction between Turkey and the EU will be positive because currently the majority of public opinion within the EU is with Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy or in opposition to Turkey's entry. In a way, the MU would become a consolation prize for Turkey as due to "its sheer size, economic success, and military power would emerge as one of the leaders of the MU" enhancing its capacity as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world.

Dr. Hadar further argues that such an initiative may be seen by the U.S. as an attempt by France to take advantage of America's weakened position in the region, but it shouldn't. Rather, he argues, the proposal should be seen as a strategy complementary of the U.S.'s military strategy in the Middle, both of whose ultimate goal is "advancing the cause of peace and political and economic reform" in the region.

More recently, President Sarkozy has said "that breaking Europe's deadlock over institutional reforms was a more urgent priority than challenging Turkey's membership ambitions; this as he made his inaugural visit to EU headquarters with a view of pushing Chancellor Merkel's drive to seek a deal at the June 21-22 summit in Brussels. This may also reflect Sarkozy's confidence that other EU members (such as Austria) will support it in preventing the unanimity required to approve Turkey's membership.

Shaheen at Aqoul takes a more skeptical view of Sarkozy's proposal. He argues that such a proposal would be hard for Sarkozy to push because France would not be the only actor. He would also have to deal with the reality that many Mediterranean countries will likely not be very enthusiastic about it and finally, in the minds of French voters, it isn't a high profile issue. The IHT article addresses this point by arguing that unlike past proposals (like Barcelona), Sarkozy's includes only those countries with an immediate coastline in the Mediterranean and an interest in cooperation. It remains to be seen just how much capital Sarkozy is willing to invest in this, and how much support it can gain among the countries who would be involved.

Still, the proposal is very interesting because to some extent it follows Barnett's theory in PNM and BFA. As Michael Barnier (Sarkozy's campaign advisor) put it, "the genius of the EU's founders was to give countries that had a history of fighting each other an incentive for peace...The deeper your economic integration, the greater your interest not to start a war."

In my view, Turkey should actually work with France on this to show that it is ready to be the bridge between Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. In the short term, this may delay Turkey's entry into the EU, however, demonstrating how much of a bridge it can be, should prove a powerful argument going forward. More importantly for the US, this proposal will force Europe to take a more active role in the Middle East, something that can only be a good thing given Sarkozy's push to move away from France's old pro-Arabist posture.

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Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Barnett v. Mann continued...and more scholarly debates on China

James Mann had a piece this past weekend in the Washington Post, titled "A Shinning Model of Wealth without Liberty." In the piece he basically followed the contours of the arguments I outlined in an earlier post. He also made an even more radical claim, that China won the Iraq war. Thomas Barnett responded to this article in his own post.

To recap:

Mann's argument for his contention that China has won the Iraq war is this. The U.S.' popularity and influence around the world have ebbed as a result of the Iraq war. This at a time when China has been emerging as an alternative to US power. Echoing my earlier post on Iran, but ending at with the opposite conclusion, Mann asserts that China serves increasingly as a blueprint for authoritarian leaders around the world, both our enemies and allies and that's bad. For Mann, this poses a challenge to the model of liberal democracy espoused by the U.S. and the West because China has proven that you "don't have to choose between power and profit; they can have both." For Mann, this outcome has come about as a result of two trends in the international arena. First, the U.S. failed foreign policy symbolized more than anything by the Iraq war. Secondly, Mann argues is "the staying power and economic success of the Chinese Communist Party." Mann again challenges the notion that as China's middle class grows, that they will challenge the party for more of a say in the governance of the country. He argues, that because the party is responsible for their newfound wealth, these elements are less likely to challenge it so long as economic growth continues. To buttress his point, Mann points out that China is not a free-market system, but rather despite its capitalistic tendencies, remains a largely state-owned and controlled economy with a very small stock market.

Mann argues that in order to address this problem we need to move beyond the notion that "every policy dispute involving China as a choice between engagement and isolation." This, while at the same time accepting that our trade, investment and interactions with china will do anything to change its political process. Mann argues that once we get beyond these two illusions, we should focus on our national interests, which include not just security and prosperity, but also the promotion of open political systems which allow their people the freedom to dissent.

Barnett responds:

Barnett counters Mann's argument by arguing against the notion that China presents a new model for anyone. Citing the examples of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, Barnett argues that China is simply following a tried and true model pursued by these other states. As single party states, they initially based their legitimacy on "rising income and development through export-driven growth." For Barnett, we already know where this process leads, just look at South Korea and Japan. The problem Barnett sees is that China is so huge and poor that the process is going to take a lot longer. He criticizes Mann for not recognizing the past examples, and because in his drive to go from A-Z in the democratic process, he ignores all of the steps in between to get from A-Z. As I argued in my recent post on Iran, Barnett also notes that it is actually good for other authoritarian regimes to look to the Chinese model. For Barnett, we should "welcome any so-called model that promotes external economic connectivity, because we know where that goes historically (i.e., where Japan and South Korea finally ended up: creating political freedoms that match their system's potential--something that took us a while to achieve as well)." In other words, China's model far from being an alternative to our own is a stepping stone along the way.

The debate on China will likely continue for some time to come. In fact, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, they have an ongoing series of debates on China.

  1. Is Communist Party rule sustainable in China? (October 5, 2006)

    Minxin Pei, senior associate and director of Carnegie’s China Program, moderated the first debate, featuring Roderick MacFarquhar of Harvard University and Andrew Nathan of Columbia University—two of the world’s preeminent scholars on the Chinese political system.

  2. Without significantly accelerated reforms and major new policy actions, will China's rapid growth unravel before its economy overtakes the U.S.? (December 1, 2006)

    Debate Topic: Without significantly accelerated reforms and major new policy actions, China's rapid growth will unravel before its economy overtakes the U.S.

    Albert Keidel, senior associate in Carnegie's China Program, moderated this second debate, featuring Barry J. Naughton of the University of California, San Diego and Wing Thye Woo of the University of California, Davis — two of the world's preeminent scholars on the Chinese economy.

  3. Is China’s military modernization program a growing threat to the United States and Asia? (February 6, 2007)

    The third debate in the Carnegie Debate Series featured Larry Wortzel and David Finkelstein—two of the world's preeminent specialists on Chinese security issues and the Chinese military. Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy provided the introductory remarks and Carnegie Senior Associate Michael D. Swaine moderated the debate. The debate was held in the Dirksen Senate Office building.

  4. Has U.S. engagement with China produced a significant improvement in human rights? (March 5, 2007)

    Debate Topic: Has American engagement with China produced a significant improvement in human rights?

    The fourth debate in the Carnegie Debate Series features Jacques deLisle and Sharon Hom. Carnegie Senior Associate Minxin Pei will moderate the debate.

  5. Does China seek to dominate Asia and drastically reduce (if not eliminate) U.S. influence as a regional power? (April 20, 2007)

    Debate Topic: Does China seek to dominate Asia and drastically reduce (if not eliminate) U.S. influence as a regional power?

    The fifth debate in the Carnegie Debate Series features Aaron Friedberg and Robert Sutter with Carnegie Senior Associate Michael Swaine as the moderator.

  6. Do China's violations of international commercial norms, including exchange rate manipulation, IPR violations and non-tariff barriers, require immediate forceful steps by its trading partners to make it play by the rules? (May 14, 2007)

    Debate Topic: Do China's violations of international commercial norms, including exchange rate manipulation, IPR violations and non-tariff barriers, require immediate forceful steps by its trading partners to make it play by the rules?

    The sixth debate in the Carnegie's Reframing China Policy Series, China's Trade Policy, features Albert Keidel and Robert B. Cassidy with Roger Ferguson as the moderator.

  7. Is China obstructing efforts to stem WMD proliferation in North Korea and Iran, necessitating a major U.S. policy reorientation?

  8. Is China’s reluctance to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the major stumbling block to effective international action on global climate change?

  9. Is China doing too little to assist the global war on terrorism, necessitating a concerted U.S. effort to elicit greater genuine Chinese anti-terrorism collaboration across the board?

  10. Is China abusing its position in international bodies in ways harmful to U.S. interests and necessitating U.S. countermeasures?

  11. Should the United States recognize Taiwan as an independent nation and commit itself to defending the island?

  12. Is China laying the groundwork for meeting its enormous future energy needs through aggressive efforts to corner global energy supplies requiring a targeted US response?

The series of debates is available as video and podcast. I have not yet had a chance to listen to them, but will as time allows. In any case, I thought I would point everyone to them to complement these posts on China. Carnegie has only hosted six of the planned twelve so this will be the link that keeps on giving, at least for some time to come.

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Saturday, May 19, 2007

Interesting discussion on Iraq at Mountainrunner's blog (Corrected)

An interesting discussion has developed between Mountainrunner, Tdaxp (two bloggers I try to read often, even if I sometimes fail) and myself on the destruction of Iraq, and its bureaucratic class.

MR and I argue, that the destruction of Iraq's professional and bureaucratic class was one of the worst things to happen after the occupation, mainly because these people for the most part were not Hussein loyalists, but essential in running the country.

Tdaxp, takes a different view and argues that "the destruction of the infrastructure that allowed a 15% minority to terrorize Iraqis is not a bad thing." This is premised on his belief that all the bureaucratic and professional class in Iraq was Baathist, and imbued with the ideology that led to the destruction of the Iraqi nation-state. premised on the belief that the bureaucratic and professional class in Iraq was Sunni Arab, and that Iraq is a country in the Gap. This means that not only did they look out for themselves, in a part of the world where that is typical and expected, but that as the Sunni Arab fraction of the population managed to shrink (out of necessity) they had to resort to increasingly violent means of hanging on to their powers and rents. Baathi ideology was cheap-talk that allowed one community to oppress the rests within the fake state that was Iraq.

Below is part of the exchange, along with an excerpt from Mountainrunner's original post which initiated the discussion. The discussion has now expanded to include Tdaxp's own post on the subject.


Confirming the Destruction of Iraq

How do you confirm you've really destroyed a country? Make sure the education system is shattered. This is especially effective in a country like Iraq that had the best university system in the Middle East / Southwest Asia.

“Medics, pharmacists, biologists and dentists are desperately seeking training in hospitals because what they have learned so far does not give them enough confidence to treat patients. There is a really huge difference between now and the times of Saddam Hussein when medical graduates left college with the competence to treat any patient,” he said.

“Children’s capacity for learning has been reduced and the main reason for thi