Somewhat good news in Iraq. Bad news in Afghanistan

Iraq:

Iraqi Sunni Lands Show New Oil and Gas Promise

By JAMES GLANZ

Published: February 19, 2007

KARABILA, Iraq, Feb. 18 — In a remote patch of the Anbar desert just 20 miles from the Syrian border, a single blue pillar of flanges and valves sits atop an enormous deposit of oil and natural gas that would be routine in this petroleum-rich country except for one fact: this is Sunni territory.

This discovery, as the Times article notes will have significant political repercussions, as one of the main arguments the Sunnis have made for a strong central government and federal allocation of oil revenues, is the fact that until now, there were no known oil, or natural gas resources in Sunni controlled Iraq. Having said that, they will take a long time to develop, particularly given the violence and instability in the region. However, at the very least, they provide the Sunnis with an incentive, and a guarantee that they will also benefit from the countries oil wealth. I still agree with Senators Clinton and Biden that a resource allocation formula needs to be worked out that allocates oil revenues equally to the three regions, but this discovery allows us a little more breathing room. According to the article, the discovery was expected and the government quietly reached out to private firms to explore the regions potential. All in all good news, something we badly need, from Iraq.

Afghanistan:

Al Qaeda Chiefs Are Seen to Regain Power

By MARK MAZZETTI and DAVID ROHDE

Published: February 19, 2007

WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 — Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan have re-established significant control over their once-battered worldwide terror network and over the past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal regions near the Afghan border, according to American intelligence and counterterrorism officials.

American officials said there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan.

The United States has also identified several new Qaeda compounds in North Waziristan, including one that officials said might be training operatives for strikes against targets beyond Afghanistan.

American analysts said recent intelligence showed that the compounds functioned under a loose command structure and were operated by groups of Arab, Pakistani and Afghan militants allied with Al Qaeda. They receive guidance from their commanders and Mr. Zawahri, the analysts said. Mr. bin Laden, who has long played less of an operational role, appears to have little direct involvement.

Officials from several different American intelligence and counterterrorism agencies presented a consistent picture in describing the developments as a major setback to American efforts against Al Qaeda.

I think the article speaks for itself. With only a few weeks remaining until the start of the Taliban's Spring offensive, indications are now that Bin Laden and Zawahiri have reestablished control over al Qaeda operations within Pakistan.

This is a development that I have seen coming, and feared for quite some time. Mainly, that our focus on Iraq significantly diverted our attention from Afghanistan to allow the groups and the territory from which 9/11 sprung to reconstitute itself. This has now come to pass. From the times article, we get this:

Some of the interviews with officials were granted after John D. Negroponte, then the director of national intelligence, told Congress last month that “Al Qaeda’s core elements are resilient” and that the organization was “cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.”

Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, told the House Armed Services Committee last week that Al Qaeda “is on the march.” He said, “Al Qaeda in fact is now functioning exactly as its founder and leader, Osama bin Laden, envisioned it,” because, he said, Qaeda leaders are planning major attacks and inspiring militants to carry out attacks around the globe.

This echoes eerily one of the quotes I added to my blog a few months ago, from Tom Barnett, who said in his blog "the day always goes to the most resilient, all things being asymmetrical and connected." Al Qaeda seems intent on proving that it's not only a contender but the main attraction.

That is what you get when you refuse to see the reality on the ground. For years now, we have known that the Taliban was growing stronger, that al Qaeda has been trying to reestablish itself in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and we have done nothing. The Times report also notes that

American intelligence and counterterrorism officials said that most of the men receiving training in Pakistan had been carrying out attacks inside Afghanistan, but that Al Qaeda had also strengthened its ties to groups in Iraq that had sworn allegiance to Mr. bin Laden. They said dozens of seasoned fighters were moving between Pakistan and Iraq, apparently engaging in an “exchange of best practices” for attacking American forces.

This is something I wrote about here on al Qaeda exporting tactics learned in the field in Iraq to Afghanistan. This is extremely troubling, as it was from the camps in Afghanistan that al Qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks. Now they have these same camps set up in Pakistan, a country so unstable and weak that were we to strike at these targets, it would topple the military regime of Pervez Musharaf, leaving his nuclear arsenal exposed. The question now is, what do we do about this? Northern Waziristan is now a base for Jihad, something the President keeps telling us is his primary reason for not leaving Iraq (allowing it to become a base for jihad) and yet here, we only hear a few words from the President, calling on NATO troops to aid us in this battle. As I've argued before, such a request always leaves me with a bad taste in my mouth, because it was there that 9/11 was born, and as such, it is our responsibility to see to it that the Taliban and al Qaeda are destroyed, not NATO's, not anyone else's but our own. This more than anything, is our fight.

In short, there is some good news, and some bad news, to say the least, in headlines this week. While we should welcome the good, we need to begin addressing the bad, and soon.

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President Bush announces the creation of new military command for Africa

The long wait has ended. Recognizing the continent's new strategic significance, the Bush administration has announced the creation of a new military command for Africa.

As the article notes, the new command does away with an outdated arrangement from the Cold War that divided Africa between three military commands, PACOM, EUCOM and CENTCOM. As Tom Barnett has noted, this rearrangement was only natural given Africa’s rising profile both in the GWOT and with regard to China’s rise as a an economic superpower. As I’ve noted in earlier posts, China sees Africa as an important region due to its burgeoning bilateral trade, and abundant natural resources. It was only natural that the US would pay more attention to Africa as a result. In today’s post, Tom states that according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whelan, Africom “will turn traditional emphasis on war-v-peace on its head by emphasizing prevention of conflict and instability over preparations for conflict” or as Tom sees it, a true SysAdmin command. Tom also notes that a question remains as to how CJTF-Horn of Africa will fit into this new command, as this was a creation of Centcom which will give up the Horn of Africa from its Area of Operations once Africom is established at the end of 2008.

Bush Creates New Military Command for Africa

By DAVID STOUT

Published: February 6, 2007

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7 -- The Pentagon will establish a new military command to oversee its operations in Africa, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced today.

Creation of the United States Africa Command, which had been expected, will “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa,” Mr. Bush said.

The president said he had directed Mr. Gates to have the command established by the fiscal year that ends on Sept. 30, 2008. The location of the new command will be determined after discussions with Congress and officials of countries on the continent, Mr. Bush said.

Mr. Gates, testifying today before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the new command will eliminate an “outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.”

Three commands now divide responsibility for operations in Africa: The European Command, which oversees most countries on the continent, except in the Horn of Africa; the Central Command, which has responsibility for Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, and the Pacific Command, which has responsibility for Madagascar, the Seychelles and the Indian Ocean area.

Further thoughts

How will this move be perceived by African nations? others? Despite the DOD stating that this command will be more focused on prevention of conflict and instability, due to our recent support for Ethiopia's military actions against the Somali ICU, and our focus on the GWOT, it is likely that this move may be seen as a militarization of our policies in Africa. That is a perception that we will have to work hard to dispel, particularly as other countries move on Africa (think China) providing aid, investment and trade opportunities that have jump started an economic revival in the continent.

One more update

Time Magazine had an article in August that speculated that Gen. William "Kip" Ward would be AFRICOM's first combatant commander. (Hatip Howard C. Berkowitz at TPM cafe for alerting me to this story. The interesting part of this story is that Gen. Ward was a commander in Somalia when Black Hawk Down took place so he has boot's on the ground experience in the types of conflicts we will be faced with. Time also reported that he oversees US military relations with 48 African countries, making him an ideal candidate for the job.

Finally, I wanted to link to the Draconian Observations, a blog that has posted extensively on AFRICOM. I just realized how many posts there are, so I haven't gone through them all. It should make for some fruitful reading. Enjoy.

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On Sen. Biden's Plan for Iraq

Yesterday, Joe Biden announced his candidacy for President of the United States. I generally like the senator, mostly because of his extensive experience in international relations. As such, I thought it would be appropriate for me to review his plan for Iraq, as this will be one of the most, if not the most important issue of the 2008 Presidential campaign. Sen. Biden, by most accounts is not considered a heavyweight contender for the democratic nomination, mostly because of Sen. Obama's star power and Sen. Clinton's name recognition. That said, I think his candidacy is still important due to his experience and the plan he has proposed as an alternative to the President's "surge" proposal. As such, below I am posting Sen. Biden's complete proposal as found on his website www.joebiden.com. Below his proposal I will provide my analysis of the plan, along with criticisms that I think he needs to address before the plan can be a true and viable alternative to President Bush's plan, or at least viable enough that others in Congress can get fully behind.

Iraq: A Way Forward

President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. His strategy is to prevent defeat and to hand the problem off to his successor. As a result, more and more Americans understandably want a rapid withdrawal, even at the risk of trading a dictator for chaos and a civil war that could become a regional war. Both are bad alternatives.

There is a third way that can achieve the two objectives most Americans share: to bring our troops home without leaving chaos behind. The idea is to maintain a unified Iraq by federalizing it and giving Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis breathing room in their own regions. The central government would be responsible for common interests, like border security and the distribution of oil revenues. The plan would bind the Sunnis - who have no oil -- by guaranteeing them a proportionate share of oil revenues. It would convene an international conference to secure support for the power sharing arrangement and produce a regional nonaggression pact, overseen by a Contact Group of major powers. It would call on the U.S. military to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2007, with a residual force to keep Iraqis and their neighbors honest. It would increase economic aid but tie it to the protection of minority rights and the creation of a jobs program and seek funding from the oil-rich Gulf Arab states. The new, central reality in Iraq is deep and growing sectarian violence between the Shiites and Sunnis. In last December's elections, 90 percent of the votes went to sectarian lists. Ethnic militias increasingly are the law in Iraq. They have infiltrated the official security forces. Massive unemployment is feeding the sectarian militia. Sectarian cleansing has forced at least 250,000 Iraqis to flee their homes in recent months. At the same time, Al Qaeda is now so firmly entrenched in Western Iraq that it has morphed into an indigenous jihadist threat. As a result, Iraq risks becoming what it was not before the war: a haven for radical fundamentalists.

There is no purely military solution to the sectarian civil war. The only way to break the vicious cycle of violence - and to create the conditions for our armed forces to responsibly withdraw -- is to give Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds incentives to pursue their interests peacefully. That requires an equitable and viable power sharing arrangement. That's where my plan comes in. This plan is not partition - in fact, it may be the only way to prevent violent partition and preserve a unified Iraq. This plan is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. This plan is the only idea on the table for dealing with the militia, which are likely to retreat to their respective regions. This plan is consistent with a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities. Indeed, it provides an agenda for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.

The example of Bosnia is illustrative. Ten years ago, Bosnia was being torn apart by ethnic cleansing. The United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords to keep the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations. We even allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of U.S. troops and others, Bosnians have lived a decade in peace. Now, they are strengthening their central government, and disbanding their separate armies.

The course we're on leads to a terrible civil war and possibly a regional war. Joe Biden's plan is designed to head that off. He believe it is the best way to bring our troops home, protect our fundamental security interests, and preserve Iraq as a unified country.

The question for those who reject this plan is simple: what is your alternative?

A Five Point Plan for Iraq

1. Establish One Iraq, with Three Regions

Federalize Iraq in accordance with its constitution by establishing three largely autonomous regions - Shiite, Sunni and Kurd -- with a strong but limited central government in Baghdad

Put the central government in charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues

Form regional governments -- Kurd, Sunni and Shiite -- responsible for administering their own regions

2. Share Oil Revenues

Gain agreement for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing them 20 percent of all present and future oil revenues -- an amount roughly proportional to their size -- which would make their region economically viable

Empower the central government to set national oil policy and distribute the revenues, which would attract needed foreign investment and reinforce each community's interest in keeping Iraq intact and protecting the oil infrastructure

3. Convene International Conference, Enforce Regional Non-Aggression Pact

Convene with the U.N. a regional security conference where Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, pledge to support Iraq's power sharing agreement and respect Iraq's borders

Engage Iraq's neighbors directly to overcome their suspicions and focus their efforts on stabilizing Iraq, not undermining it

Create a standing Contact Group, to include the major powers, that would engage Iraq's neighbors and enforce their commitments

4. Responsibly Drawdown US Troops

Direct U.S. military commanders to develop a plan to withdraw and re-deploy almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2007

Maintain in or near Iraq a small residual force -- perhaps 20,000 troops -- to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq's neighbors honest and train its security forces

5. Increase Reconstruction Assistance and Create a Jobs Program

Provide more reconstruction assistance, conditioned on the protection of minority and women's rights and the establishment of a jobs program to give Iraqi youth an alternative to the militia and criminal gangs

Insist that other countries take the lead in funding reconstruction by making good on old commitments and providing new ones -- especially the oil-rich Arab Gulf countries

Plan for Iraq: What It Is - and What It Is Not

Some commentators have either misunderstood the Plan, or mischaracterized it. Here is what the plan is - and what it is not:

1. The Plan is not partition.

In fact, it may be the only way to prevent a violent partition - which has already started -- and preserve a unified Iraq. We call for a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities for truly common interests like foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues. Indeed, the Plan provides an agenda for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.

2. The Plan is not a foreign imposition.

To the contrary, it is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which already provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. On October 11, Iraq's parliament approved legislation to implement the constitution's articles on federalism. Prior to the British colonial period and Saddam's military dictatorship, what is now Iraq functioned as three largely autonomous regions.

But federalism alone is not enough. To ensure Sunni support, it is imperative that Iraqis also agree to an oil revenue sharing formula that guarantees the Sunni region economic viability. The United States should strongly promote such an agreement. The final decisions will be up to Iraqis, but if we do not help them arrange the necessary compromises, nothing will get done. At key junctures in the past, we have used our influence to shape political outcomes in Iraq, notably by convincing the Shiites and Kurds to accept a provision allowing for the constitution to be amended following its adoption, which was necessary to secure Sunni participation in the referendum. Using our influence is not the same as imposing our will. With 140,000 Americans at risk, we have a right and an obligation to make known our views.

3. The Plan is not an invitation to sectarian cleansing.

Tragically, that invitation has been sent, received and acted upon. Since the Samarra mosque bombing in February, one quarter of a million Iraqis have fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate now approaching 10,000 people a week. That does not include hundreds of thousands of Iraqis - many from the professional class - who have left Iraq since the war. Only a political settlement, as proposed in the Plan, has a chance to stop this downward spiral.

4. The Plan is the only idea on the table for dealing with the sectarian militia.

It offers a realistic albeit interim solution. Realistic, because none of the major groups will give up their militia voluntarily in the absence of trust and confidence and neither we or the Iraqi government has the means to force them to do so. Once federalism is implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their own and vie for power, instead of killing the members of other groups. But it is only an interim solution, because no nation can sustain itself peacefully with private armies. Over time, if a political settlement endures, the militia would be incorporated into regional and national forces, as is happening in Bosnia.

5. The Plan is an answer to the problem of mixed cities.

Large cities with mixed populations present a challenge under any plan now being considered. The essence of the Plan is that mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is truly satisfied with the overall arrangement. If so, that leadership will help keep the peace in the cities. At the same time, we would make Baghdad a federal city, and buttress the protection of minorities there and in the other mixed cities with an international peacekeeping force. Right now, the prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more likely to participate, including countries like Saudi Arabia which have offered peacekeepers in the past.

6. The Plan is in the self-interest of Iran.

Iran likes it exactly as it is in Iraq - with the United States bogged down and bleeding. But the prospect of a civil war in Iraq is not in Tehran's interest: it could easily spill over Iraq's borders and turn into a regional war with neighbors intervening on opposing sides and exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite divide at a time Shiite Iran is trying to exert leadership in the Islamic world. Iran also would receive large refugee flows as Iraqis flee the fighting. Iran, like all of Iraq's neighbors, has an interest in Iraq remaining unified and not splitting into independent states. Iran does not want to see an independent Kurdistan emerge and serve as an example for its own restive 5 million Kurds. That's why Iran - and all of Iraq's neighbors -- can and should be engaged to support a political settlement in Iraq.

7. The Plan is in the self-interest of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

The Sunnis increasingly understand they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites or having the freedom to control their day-to-day lives in a Sunni region, they are likely to choose the latter provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a Sunni insurgency, which can bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds may dream of independence, but fear the reaction of Turkey and Iran - their interest is to achieve as much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together. Why would Shiites and Kurds give up some oil revenues to the Sunnis? Because that is the price of peace and the only way to attract the massive foreign investment needed to maximize Iraqi oil production. The result will be to give Shiites and Kurds a smaller piece of a much larger oil pie and give all three groups an incentive to protect the oil infrastructure.

In order to provide my analysis in the most efficient manner possible I will use Sen. Biden's numbering system and criticize assertions or assumptions he makes that may affect the outcome of his plan.

1. Establish one Iraq with three regions

While I mostly agree with Sen. Biden's recommendations, I have a few reservations and questions about the process of creating the three semi-autonomous regions he advocates. First, dividing Iraq into a Sunni West, Shiite south and Kurdish north raises various problems. With regard to the Shiites, Sen. Biden makes the assumption that once his plan is in place, the militias of al Sadr, the Badr organization and others will likely retreat to their ethnic enclaves. The problem with that assumption is that although some groups may indeed retreat, al Sadr's group will not. Al Sadr considers himself an Iraqi nationalist, and as such is unlikely to accept any such proposal without a fight. He has even sent his militia to Kirkuk in an effort to prevent that city from falling under Kurdish control (and to protect city residents, many of which are his followers). Kirkuk is a thorny issue, because although the Kurds view it as representing a vital part of any future Kurdish state (or region) it also contains substantial minorities of Shiites and more importantly, Turkmen (who have sided with the Sunni insurgency, and sought Turkish aid in an attempt to prevent the Kurds from driving them out Kirkuk). Sen. Biden, attempting to address these very issues states in his plan that for ethnically diverse cities a strong multinational force will be set up to keep the peace. Normally, that strategy would work, however, given the importance that Kurds attach to the city it is unlikely (though not impossible) that they will compromise and allow it to remain a "neutral" city. That, of course opens the issue to even wider repercussions, particularly as it relates to Iran and Turkey, both of which have a substantial Kurdish minority within their borders that for years has been pushing for more autonomy from their respective states. Both Turkey and Iran would likely see any move toward a regional division in Iraq, that encapsulates the current reality of Kurdistan (largely autonomous from the central government, flying its own flag, not Iraq's and without any real Iraqi army presence to speak of) as a further move toward Kurdish independence. This perception will likely make any compromise difficult to achieve.

In addition, any partition that leaves the Shiite south as a self-sustaining entity within Iraq will probably accelerate the move toward a theocratic form of government there. Already, we know that much of the south is controlled by the militias who enforce religious law in a manner reminiscent of the Taliban. The question I would pose to Sen. Biden is, given this reality, once the regions are divided would we then seek to overturn the religiously inclined government likely to emerge in southern Iraq? Ayatollah Sistani (who opposes the theocratic model) can help, but given the fact that he has lost a lot of influence following the Samarra mosque incident, it is doubtful he can do much. Iran is also likely to emerge as the main player in southern Iraq following the division so that is also a concern. Sen. Biden states that the regional security conference will deal with this last issue and establish a means to move Iran from undermining Iraqi security to stabilizing the country, particularly southern Iraq. However, given the current administration's position it is doubtful they will accept the rise of Iran (already a reality) as the main player in southern Iraq.

With regard to the Sunnis, Sen. Biden's plan gives them a stake in the future of the country by allocating them a 20% share of existing and future oil revenue, and giving them their own autonomous region. In doing so, Sen. Biden posits that the Kurds and Shiites will acquiesce to such a proposal because they know that ending the insurgency is the best way to draw forieng investiment to develop Iraq's petroleum industry. Hence, although accepting a smaller piece of the petroleum pie, the pie will be larger.

As stated earlier, he also sees the militias of each ethnic group as retreating into their respective enclaves, hence becoming the security forces of their respective regions. That is where I think part of the problem arises in the Sunni region. The Kurds have the Peshmerga to act as their region's army, the Shiites have the Badr organization, al Sadr's Mahdi army (the two dominant players) which could constitute the Shiite region's security forces, however, in western Iraq, there are various insurgent groups some Baathists, others nationalists, yet others such as the Turkmen largely ethnic militias that seek to protect their minorities from majority oppression, and finally, the foreign Islamists component (which following the death of Zarqawi has become more of an indigenous force). The question is, who will be the army keeping the peace in western Iraq? Will American forces have to train it? If so, what benchmarks will we establish and how do we ensure that the training and weapons we provide it don't end up with either AQI or foreign Islamists components? Given western Iraq's lack of a security apparatus, will the US commit more forces there in an effor to establish one?

Later in his plan, Sen. Biden states that once a political settlement is achieved and other benchmarks met, other countries are likely to provide troops, such as Saudi Arabia. However, although it would be nice to have forces from regional allies in the country, the truth is that Iraq's government has repeatedly refused them fearing that these forces would seek to gain profit, or land at the nation's advantage. That is still true today. Moreover, having a country like Saudi Arabia send troops to keep the peace in Iraq is likely to be detrimental to our ultimate goal, for the same reason it would be detrimental to have Iranian troops in Iraq; mainly, we would end up with fundamentalist Wahabi Sunnis and fundamentalist Iranian Shiites, spreading their own religious ideologies in a country already torn by religious divisions.

Sen. Biden's plan calls for the central government in Iraq to be in charge of "truly common interests" such as "border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues." The problem I foresee with this proposal is with border defense. First, the Iraqi army is mostly Shiite, with some Kurdish forces (former Peshmerga) and a few Sunnis. If the central government is charged with border defense, given the current make-up of the army, how do we ensure that border agents don't exacerbate tensions between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. That is, because the borders of Iraq are large, and the majority of the army is Shiite, some of these forces will have to patrol Iraq's border in majority Sunni areas which due to their ties to majority Sunni countries are major transit points feeding Iraq's insurgency. Even if a political settlement is reached, due to the lack of trust between Sunnis and Shiites, Sunnis will likely want to continue importing arms, equipment, etc, from their Sunni neighbors because they will believe (not irrationally) that the Shiites are doing the same with Iran. As such, tensions are likely to arise as these border guards seek to stop the flow of goods and money to Iraq's Sunni. Sen. Biden can say that we will draw these border guards (or army units) from their own ethnic regions to prevent these tensions, but then the issue arises of whether (for the same reasons given above) they will be effective in preventing the flow of arms, money and other equipment to their regions from neighboring countries. Sen. Biden argues in his plan for the Contact Group, and US and Multinational forces to keep the sides honest. Does that mean that we will embed our troops with border guards to ensure compliance?

Furthermore, given that al Qaeda in Iraq has demonstrated a willingness and a capacity for instigating religous violence. If we divide the regions, apart from their own security forces, how do we ensure that an AQI attack in Shiite areas does not provoke all out war between a Shiite army, and a new Sunni army? That is, as we separate the country into three semi-autonomous regions under the central government, who will keep the peace between their borders? While the senator would likely point to American and Multinational forces once the political settlement is achieved, I would argue that we would first have to demonstrate that it is holding and working. As such, I believe that American forces will be required to do the heavy lifting for the foreseeable future (likely beyond Sen. Biden's 2007 plan for withdrawing them). Is that part of his plan? or does he believe that Iraqi army units would better suited to the task?

2. Share Oil Revenues

The plan is hinged on the assumption that Sunnis will accept the 20% revenue allocation compromise, what if they don't? What other options do we have? Would we move to allow the Shiites and Kurds to have their own regions, giving the Sunnis their own region by default?

3. Convene International Conference, Enforce Regional Non-Aggression Pact

I only have two questions here. First, will China be included among the major powers in the region? It should be, as of now it is the only major power whom all countries in the region see as an objective player. Second, this will probably be a product of the conference but I think it should be addressed anyway. What type of enforcement mechanism will we seek to ensure that a Non-Aggression Pact is preserved? that Iraq's neighbors do not undermine the peace process? and that the three regions within Iraq keep to their commitments, that is apart from the threat to withhold reconstruction assistance?

4. Responsibly Drawdown US Troops

I've asked this question above. What will be the role of US forces both during the creation of the three regions outlined and once they come into being? That is, will our forces be focused more on engaging terrorists (al Qaeda) or will we take on the task of securing the border between the three regions to ensure that peace is kept? Sen. Biden states that our forces and allied forces will also patrol ethnically and religiously mixed cities to prevent war from breaking out between the three major players over who gets to keep them (Kirkuk). Given our inability to keep the peace in these cities now, what ensures that we will be able to do so once the regions become safe-havens for ethnic/religious militias that will come into the cities to exact vengeance or pain on other ethnic/religious groups in a bid to push them out of the cities in the future? What happens if the regional governments are actively aiding and abetting such actions?

Increase Reconstruction Assistance and Create a Jobs Program

In this section, I again raise the issue of what enforcement mechanisms we will employ apart from denial of reconstruction aid, if minority and women's rights are not protected? This is particularly relevant in a region like southern Iraq where the Shiite regional government will likely receive a lot of assistance from Iran, thereby providing a cushion for them in case of the denial of American reconstruction assistance. Additionally, one proposal I would like to see in this section, is to allow and indeed encourage countries (particularly other Western nations and China) who opposed the Iraq war to invest in business ventures within Iraq. This would go a long way to providing them with a larger stake in the reconstruction and stability of the country than they currently have. The proposal may not play well with conservatives here in our country, as they will likely argue that we have expended our blood and treasure on Iraq, and hence we should be the one's to benefit from any business ventures in the country. This however, is a myopic view as our larger interest is to see a stable, prosperous Iraq, and bringing in more businesses seeking opportunities in the country will go a long way to giving Iraqis a stake in that stability.

Miscellaneous Issues

In my critique of Sen. Biden's plan I assumed that Iran would not have a problem with an autonomous Shiite region in the south, however, like the Kurdish region, an autonomous Shiite region poses a particularly thorny problem for Iran. Iran has a substantial Arab Shiite population within its borders which has for a long time sought more autonomy and rights within the Persian nation. Having an autonomous Shiite region next to its border, will likely complicate the Iranian government's position within its own borders and may impede any Iranian acquiescence to its creation and by extension, to end its meddling in the region's affairs. As such, what steps will the US take in the case that Iran chooses not to agree to Sen. Biden's proposal? Furthermore, given the many problems the two autonomous regions will create for Iran, it will likely want something in return. That something, will probably revolve around the nuclear issue. As such, is Senator Biden prepared to negotiate with Iran with everything on the table, in the manner advocated by Thomas Barnett? If not, how far is he willing to go to gain Iranian cooperation?

Well, this is a comprehensive list of my concerns, and the questions I have with regard to the Biden plan. Can anyone think of anything else I'm missing? As I said at the outset, this is by far one of the best efforts at coming up with a solution to the Iraqi morass we find ourselves in, as such, it is worthy of our attention.

As an aside, Sen. Biden's campaign also has a blog where you can ask questions and voice your concerns. My interest, for the most part is in our nation's national security and foreign policy, so I will devote most of my energy to that. As a final note, based on this plan, I am leaning heavily toward supporting a Biden presidential run, at least as far as the democratic primary is concerned. The reason, for me is simple, given our problems abroad, we need a person with the experience and knowledge necessary to address them. The time is still early, and I may yet change my mind. In coming weeks I will try to find, and critique Sen. Clinton's and Sen. Obama's plans for Iraq, though I agree with Sen. Biden's critique of these, for the most part. I will also