AFRICOM and the balance of power in Africa

This month saw the official launch of AFRICOM as a subcommand of European Command, with a view to completing its transition as a separate command by October 2008. I posted earlier this year on the trouble AFRICOM was having in finding a home on the continent. Since then, the situation has gotten better but the US will have to navigate regional politics in order to secure basing rights on the continent.

As recent as a couple of weeks ago, Nigeria made it known that it was discussing, with members of the African Union and ECOWAS, different means of blocking any attempt by the US to set up a base in the Gulf of Guinea. In like manner, South Africa's Defense Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota also issued a statement saying that additional U.S. troops were not welcomed in the continent, adding that this was the unanimous position of the Southern African Development Community, which is made up of fourteen African countries. Additionally, he threatened any African country willing to base American military forces with the consequences of their actions, implying a cooling of relations with its African neighbors. This was perceived by many to be directed at those few countries that have already stated an interest in housing Africa Command. Among these are Liberia, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Gabon, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and possibly Botswana, which recently disclosed discussions with South Africa and the US regarding AFRICOM. This revelation, however, was made two weeks ago and prior to Defense Minister Lekota's statement on the issue.

There are many reasons for the resistance to the hosting of AFRICOM bases in the continent. These range from those mentioned in other posts, such as the fear that hosting an AFRICOM station would make the host country a likely target for al Qaeda operations, to fear of the influence the US would be able to exert within the host country itself and the region due to its military presence. This, without mentioning the perception (in large part thanks to US support for Ethiopia's operations in Somalia) that AFRICOM will result in the complete militarization of American Foreign Policy in Africa; its creation already being seen as the official arrival of the Global War on Terror in the continent.

The US, seeking to quell some of these fears, has repeatedly emphasized that AFRICOM, more than anything is about "the four Ps and the three Ds: Prevention of conflict, promotion of regional stability, protection of American and African interests and prevailing against the rise of extremism through diplomacy, development and defense. The problem, of course, is that the CJTF-Horn of Africa was described in the same way, and that image was shattered by the US government's endorsement of Ethiopia's actions in Somalia, followed by the use of American military force in the country. As argued in an earlier post on this subject, I noted (citing Tom Barnett's Esquire article) that American actions in Somalia "damaged the positive presence that the CJTF-Horn of Africa had worked so hard to establish" there.

In that same piece, also noting Barnett's observation regarding the reasons behind Djibouti's decision to host the CJTF-Horn of Africa, I argued that there would be other African nations who would likely step up to host AFRICOM for similar reasons; in this case, as a check on regional hegemons, such as Nigeria and South Africa. This more than anything, explains these countries’ efforts to block the establishment of AFRICOM bases in their respective regions, and can be seen as attempts to prevent the rise of a countervailing force to their power. The map below provides a clearer picture of this:

Map edited by NYkrinDC, from the original at Stratfor.

As can be seen from the map above, which details the regional interests of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia and U.S. AFRICOM, there is some overlap. This is particularly true of Nigeria and the US. Nigeria already sees itself as the purveyor of security in the region, and perceives the establishment of an AFRICOM base in the Gulf of Guinea region, as an attempt by the U.S. to displace it. Nigeria's fear is not unfounded, as in 2002, the US declared West African oil as a strategic asset, one the US would use military force to protect.

The U.S. has sought to address these concerns by stressing that AFRICOM's "foremost mission is to help Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on terrorism or secure African resources." The U.S. has argued that it will do this by strengthening Africa's multilateral institutions, which of late, have been playing a greater role in the continent's security affairs. Indeed, one of the U.S.'s biggest selling points is that Africa Command will be different from the other Commands in that it "will be staffed by a large number of State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development members, including a senior foreign service officer to serve as the military commander’s civilian deputy." However, an American base, regardless of American intentions will change the power dynamic in the region, or anywhere such a base or bases are finally established, because they allow a new player on the proverbial poker table, with deep pockets and the guns to match. Even so, the U.S. does have a case for, in Barnettian terms, exporting security to the Gulf of Guinea region. As has been documented in various articles throughout the last couple of years, Nigeria has been unable to deal with militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, leaving many offshore oil platforms vulnerable to attacks and hijackings from these forces, who seek a re-allocation of oil revenue emanating from the Delta, but largely controlled and spent outside of it. The U.S. rightly argues that an additional naval presence would provide greater security to the region from pirates, insurgents and smugglers who prey on offshore oil facilities. As if that were not enough, Nigeria is also having to contend with Liberia's President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who has sought to remake the country into the US's largest supporters in the region.

In like manner, South Africa also fears an encroaching U.S. presence in Southern Africa, as a result of Robert Mugabe and the crisis in Zimbabwe. In recent years, as South Africa's internal politics have stabilized, the country has sought to reclaim its role as the South African regions' hegemon. An American base in Southern Africa, would upset these plans for the reasons mention above with regard to Nigeria. Already South Africa has been working on creating a Southern Africa Development Community peace-keeping force to handle the continents many problem zones. It has also purchased advanced weapons from Europe and the US to consolidate its military power.

While many of the overlapping interest zones are a source of tension between South Africa and Nigeria on the one hand, and the new U.S. Africa Command on the other, there are also many opportunities for cooperation. One such place is in the rapidly deteriorating situation in DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, where not only South Africa, but also the US have a role to play in preventing the outbreak of a third major war. For South Africa, the trouble there is two fold as it sees Angola possibly influencing events in the DR Congo and Zimbabwe in a manner unfavorable to South Africa's long-term interests. Additionally, Nigeria can benefit from an increased American naval presence in the area, to reduce the space in which MEND and oil smugglers have to function in the region.

The U.S. has announced that Africa Command will be divided among six different bases, so tensions between the US and regional African powers is likely to increase as the US prepares to for the launch of AFRICOM as a stand-alone Command. The task will not be easy, and will become more difficult the more protracted and chaotic the situation in Somalia becomes, as this is seen rightly or wrongly, as AFRICOM's first test, and as a harbinger of things to come.

Still, there are some positive signs of talks between the parties. In the following months, Nigeria's Defense Ministry will be sending a delegation to Washington to discuss AFRICOM, and we can expect a similar move on the part of South Africa. Ethiopia, for its part, has already acceded to an American presence in its region under the CJTF-HOA. These discussions, and how the U.S. addresses the issues raised by the Southern and Western hegemons will likely determine whether and how the U.S. establishes bases on the continent. The U.S. has already sought to strengthen its position by increasing military aid and weapons' sales to oil rich nations and friendly states. This means that with or without Nigerian or South African acquiescence, the bases will be established.

That said, one of the earliest proponents of such a Command, Thomas Barnett, has argued against establishing any AFRICOM headquarters in Africa proper, and instead has called for establishing those headquarters state-side to serve as a nascent Department of Everything Else or SysAdmin, while letting SOCOM handle any kinetic actions deemed necessary in the continent. Barnett calls for re-creating the CJTF-HOA in Africa's South, West and Central regions. As noted from above, given the CJTF-HOA's bad rep resulting from Somalia, this may prove difficult. Still, it is an interesting idea, and an alternative to trying to network AFRICOM's headquarters from six distinct bases, not to mention the Navy's alternate proposal, "to house AFRICOM on a high tech joint command and control ship that would circumnavigate the region."

As the fall of 2008 approaches, tensions with regional hegemons will likely rise over AFRICOM's future, and it remains to be seen whether they will acquiesce to welcoming an American presence or be forced to accept it by default. That will determine in large part AFRICOM's success, since cooperation between the Command and Africa's largest economic, military and political powers will be essential to addressing the continent's many problems.