AFRICOM struggles to find a home

In February of this year, President Bush announced the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM). Since then, it seems the administration has been having a bit of difficulty finding a country willing to host it.

According to the WAPO,

"[a] U.S. delegation seeking a home for a new military command in Africa got a chilly reception during a tour of the northern half of the continent this month, running into opposition even in countries that enjoy friendly relations with the Pentagon"

including, Algeria, Libya and Morocco. In fact, the question of hosting Africa Command seems to present a political liability for each government. For example, the article cites the example of Morocco where after an opposition party publicly stated that the government had already agreed to host AFRICOM, the government issued a stern denial calling it "baseless information."

The article also notes how each government's response is a reflection of the public's opposition to American policies in the Muslim world.

People on the street assume their governments have already had too many dealings with the U.S. in the war on terror at the expense of the rule of law.

Many may say that this is an unfair characterization of American relations with these countries, however given recent reports that the US moved its secret prisons from Europe to North Africa, the various moves by these governments to either squelch dissent or limit the rights of their populations to fight the al Qaeda threat, it is understandable. In short, we are associated with the policies of the governments in the region, because these policies are seen as being part of our War on Terror.

Even though the US insists that "the main mission for the command would be to stabilize weak or poor countries by training local security forces and doling out humanitarian aid," many North Africans don't appear to be buying. As I argued in my post on the President's announcement, that was one of the main questions/problems facing AFRICOM; how would it be perceived by Africans themselves? The perception, however is not unanimous. In a guest column on June 25, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argued that AFRICOM was not a bad thing, but could be a great thing for Africa. In this column she argued that

AFRICOM should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations.

The Africom charter specifies that the new command will focus on conflict prevention, rather than intervention. It will work with African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Ecowas, in coordination with other donor countries, to improve security capabilities and promote military professionalization and accountable governance.

If AFRICOM aims to use its "soft power" mandate to develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans can be improved, African nations should work with AFRICOM to achieve their own development and security goals. Through these means, the potential of AFRICOM can far exceed its initially limited scope of engagement. To achieve the greatest possible results in development, security, and governance, this must be the model for donor assistance in the future: helping governments that are willing to help themselves.

Liberians can only hope that the United States will use AFRICOM to raise standards for engagement and help change "the way of doing business" in Africa. AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests—but this does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones.

This, however, is a minority view. Many Africans, particularly following our support for Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia are wary of what Africa Command will mean for Africa. Sirleaf acknowledges as much in her column, even while pointing to the positive aspects of the command. In his piece on Africa Command, Tom Barnett noted how even some of our military officers realized how badly Somalia had damaged the positive presence that the CJTF-Horn of Africa had worked so hard to establish. He quotes Captain Bob Wright as stating that

[t]he whole affair was a nightmare...trashing years of patient effort by hundreds of officers to present a new and different face of the U.S. military.

Even more than that, however, it is also clear that given the rise of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, many of the governments in the region would also be wary of having AFRICOM based on their soil. The reason, because regardless of the benefits it would provide them, it would also upon establishment make them a high level target for AQ. Morocco has already been hit a few times, so has Algeria and both are less than enthusiastic about the prospect of hosting AFRICOM. This even as the Pentagon has signaled that it may "'network' the command from several sites in Africa, rather than have a single headquarters," maybe as a means of spreading the pain.

In his piece in Esquire, Barnett cited one of Djibouti's reasons for hosting the CJTF-HOA as a means of balancing and curtailing the involvement of its neighbors. It can be argued that given its recent past, Sirleaf is giving us a hint that Liberia is willing to host AFRICOM for similar reasons. It will be interesting to see how this develops, and which countries eventually end up competing to host either a unitary command, or parts of a new "networked" command.