Meanwhile, in Somalia...

When it rains, it pours. As if we already didn't have our hands full with Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese crisis and Afghanistan (to mention the most important crises), it seems as if things are beginning to heat up in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. As many of you know, during the last few months the Union Islamic Courts has all but consolidated its power in the country. The US, has been worried about this development for two reasons. First, the situation in Somalia is reminiscent of Afghanistan, where lawlessness and violence led to the rise of a radical militia known as the Taliban. The Taliban brought peace and security to Afghanistan, but it did so with a barbaric form of justice. As if that wasn't enough, the Taliban also invited and protected the al Qaeda network which perpetrated the September 11, 2001 attacks in our country. Similarly, in Somalia, the UIC was born from the violence and lawlessness of the country, and became a popular movement thanks in large part to its opposition to the warlords that up until now had been the primary causes of the violence in the country. Where ever the UIC went, it removed warlords, and established a secure environment for people tired of war. Much like the Taliban, they have done this through the imposition of a harsh brand of justice, raiding cinemas and private homes screening Indian and Western, and the 2006 world cup. The second reason behind the US's discomfort with the UIC was the fact that upon coming to power in the country, they appointed a hard line cleric, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, as their nominal leader. He is accused by the US of protecting and aiding al Qaeda members in the Horn of Africa, and as such his rise to power is particularly worrisome.

Prior to the rise of the UIC, the United Nations with the support of Western Powers had helped in the creation of a Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. With the rise of the UIC, the future of the fledgling government was cast into doubt, as it was not only weak but also lacking any armed forces to extend its rule throughout the country. Due to events on the ground, the UN, Ethiopia and other powers convened a negotiations between both the TFG and the ICU to establish a national unity government that would better balance secular and Islamist forces in the country. After the first set of negotiations broke down, the TFG refused to send a delegation to a scheduled negotiation meeting in Khartoum, where a delegation of the UIC was already waiting, arguing that the UIC had violated earlier agreements. This situation prompted the UIC to declare its intention to march upon the seat of the UN sponsored TFG, in Baidoa, and resolve the matter through force. As of yesterday (July 19) the UIC was 25 miles south of Baidoa, in the town of Buurhakana, and moving north. According to some news reports the UIC fighters are backed by foreign fighters, mostly from Eritrea.

This is where this gets interesting. The TFG is protected and supported by the government of Ethiopia. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bitter war from 1998-2000, and relations between the two countries have been tense ever since. The TFG in Somalia, has already accused Eritrea of training and supporting the UIC and during the last few days Ethiopia has made clear its intention to protect the TFG. Such an event will not only plunge Somalia into a full scale civil war, but the potential exists that the war would expand outside of Somali borders and engage Ethiopia and Eritrea once again. Adding fuel to this fire is the fact that the UIC is allied to the "Muslim separatists in the Oromo region of Ethiopia" whom Eritrea also supports. Meaning, that a victory by the UIC over the transitional government would not only consolidate UIC control over Somalia, but would also leave Ethiopia between two Islamist controlled African nations (Sudan and Somalia) and its main enemy, Eritrea. Ethiopia therefore has every reason to intercede in the Somalia conflict to prevent this eventuality. If it does, the conflict will likely expand throughout the region, and make it a tempting target for al Qaeda infiltration.

Given the importance of this region which encompasses the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, the repercussions of this conflict will be great. Ethiopian troops have already crossed the border and are in Somalia, poised to defend the Transitional Federal Government, so even as as Palestine and Lebanon burn, so too will Somalia. On a positive note, the TFG yesterday accepted to resume talks with the Islamists, however the action may have come too late to prevent the outset of violence in the region, particularly given UIC pronouncements stating that "nothing will stop them now" from destroying the TFG. Making the situation even more tenuous, are accusations by Kenya that the terrorists who perpetrated a terrorist attack in Kenya against Israeli interests have been hiding in Somalia. The US Department of State today expressed concern about the situation in Somalia and urged all parties to return to the negotiating table, however, given that the UIC is only 25 miles from the TFG it is unclear whether they will be willing to turn back now. Unless, this situation is resolved, the flare up in the Middle East is likely to be only one of the many fires we are going to have to contain in the coming months.

Update:

The BBC is reporting that Ethiopian troops have crossed the border and made their way into Baidoa to reinforce the TFG. As a result, the UIC has begun pulling its forces back from Burhakaba, avoiding a potential widening of the conflict. The Islamist group now argues that "an attack on Baidoa was never planned..."

According to the BBC, this move by Ethiopia, far from helping the TFG may have actually hurt it since it now will be seen as nothing but an Ethiopian puppet government, leading to a substantial loss of support among the Somali population. If true, this means that the UIC played a very astute card, by threatening to attack the TFG and forcing Ethiopia to show its hand. Such an outcome is likely not what the US was looking for, as this leaves the UIC as the only credible force in Somalia.

Second Update:

According to Australian news the Islamists in Somalia are calling for Somalis to prepare for war against Ethiopia following the incursion of Ethiopian soldiers into Somalian soil to preotect the TFG. The Ethiopian government claimed that they had not sent any soldiers to Ethiopia, and that people were confusing TFG soldiers with Ethiopian soldiers because Ethiopia had donated military uniforms to them.

As if this news was not bad enough, according to ABC, "Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, speaking on Radio Shabelle" called on Somalis to prepare for Holy War (Jihad) against the Ethiopian troops protecting the TFG. Somalis in Mogadishu have apparently heeded the call, and have held demonstrations against Ethiopian involvement in the country. The news reports, again point out that any involvement by an outside party to protect the TFG is likely to undermine its authority further as most Somalis do not want any foreign interference in their affairs, particularly that of neighboring countries such as Ethiopia.

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Elsewhere in the Muslim world...

Afghanistan

I missed this yesterday, but it appears that the Taliban has taken control of two towns in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border. This seems to be part of their strategy to test the NATO's willingness to suffer casualties as they prepare to take over security in Southern Afghanistan. According to the article

Large numbers of militants chased out police after a brief clash in the town of Naway-i-Barakzayi, in Helmand province near the Pakistan border, a local police official said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. Scores of Taliban forces overran police holed up Sunday in a compound in the nearby Helmand town of Garmser. The security forces and a handful of government officials fled, a local government official said. The official, also speaking on condition of anonymity because he did not have permission to speak to the media, said Taliban forces were now "moving freely" around the Garmser and the surrounding district. "We have heard reports of two districts in southern Helmand being under control of the Taliban, and we are in contact with lots of people to build an accurate picture," said another coalition spokesman, Maj. Scott Lundy.

These are areas where our forces are just now beginning to reenter since the resistance intensified, and seem to be tied to some extent to the efforts by US and NATO forces to eradicate opium cultivation in the region. The Taliban have reportedly offered themselves up as hired guns for local warlords in exchange for money and weaponry.

I will post on this situation with more in-depth analysis in the coming days, I just thought that given the amount of coverage of the Israeli-Lebanese crisis, this would likely be lost in the noise.

Turkey

In the last couple of days, Turkey has stepped up its criticism of the US and its failure to rein in or address the problematic PKK in Northern Iraq. The article here notes that

"the recent escalation of terrorist attacks in the east and southeast of the country have forced the government to take a tougher stance on the continued Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) presence in northern Iraq...

In my post on the Turkish movie, Valley of the wolves-Iraq, I argued that we needed to address the issue of the PKK as it was a very large thorn in our relations with Turkey. Our ambassador to Turkey has warned the Turks against taking unilateral action in Northern Iraq, but the issue will likely continue to affect our relationship until it is resolved.

That this issue is coming up now that we are dealing with Israel and Hezbollah, is no surprise. Turkey, like Israel have been dealing with insurgent groups which have their bases of operations in bordering countries. The PKK, like Hezbollah has engaged in hit and run attacks, and has resupplied itself in Northern Iraq to continue its fight for Kurdish self-determination against Ankara. Turkey has just about had enough, since like Israel, the insurgent group is based in a friendly country, that due to its instability cannot rein in the militants.

That it is now asking the US and the Iraqi government to address this issue, is meant as a reminder that Lebanon is not the only country that harbors insurgents attacking Western allies. The timing, Turkey lkely hopes, will force the US to deal effectively with the PKK.

Turkey however, is not the only country experiencing problems with the Kurds. Iran has also seen a rise in PJAK attacks (the Iranian equivalent of the PKK). Iran's response has been similar, to Turkey's. It has began attacking, capturing and prosecuting members of both the PKK and the PJAK in its territory. In addition, it has also fired missiles into the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq, and attacked northern Iraqi positions it believed to be used by the PJAK to carry operations in Iran.

While the crisis with the Kurds in Iran and Turkey have yet to escalate to the level of Hezbollah attacks in Israel, unless we begin to address them they will. While we may be reticent to go after a group that is attacking Iran, we also need to remember that it is also attacking one of our main allies in the region; Turkey.

This brings up another thought, is Peters' theory playing itself out even as we try to resolve our own crises in the region. After all, if the Kurds succeed in breaking off the kurdish enclaves in both Turkey and Iran, the creation of a Free Kurdish state is likely to follow. As the above shows, however, such an eventuality will be not only violent, but also very bloody. Still, how much would the US have to push, and move pieces in its chess board to reach that end point?

Also, if I tie Barnett into this, how would a reshaping of borders affect our current grand strategy of reconnecting the Middle East to the world economy? Given that in order to reach the Peters map there would need to be much bloodshed and war, it would seem as if Barnett's rewiring of the Middle East would have to be put into the back burner.

Looked at a different way, could both futures be competing with one another in the region? If so, which seems to be gaining more traction, Peters new map, or Barnett's global connectivity? Which should we be aiming for?

Barnett argues for that future worth creating, where connectivity would trump tribal and ethnic divisions, whereas Peters seems to argue that only by removing those divisions would we be able to secure the Middle East. That is a huge difference of perspective. So far Barnett is ahead of the game as he has already proposed a plan to implement his vision, I'll have to read more on Peters to see where his theory leads and whether he has fully thought through how to implement it. Till then, any comments are welcomed.

Update on regional events

Rather than write another lengthy post myself, I thought I would just link to Abu Aardvark's and Tom barnett's posts on the current crisis, the first is Sunni-Shia or regimes-people?, the second, Saudis making nice with Iran. and Barnett's A sense of the wider conflict emerges Their insights on this situation raise some interesting questions, and as such, should be read carefully. I'm still digesting them, and will be back with my observations later in the day.

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Update on the Israeli-Lebanese crisis

According to the Turkish Daily News, Iran's Foreign minister called for a cease-fire yesterday to exchange prisoners between Israel and Arab militants (read Hamas and Hezbollah). UPI has a roundup of news from the Arab press, among this is that from al-Khaleej which has reported that

"unnamed U.S. official ridiculed Iran's call for a cease-fire and exchanging prisoners between Hezbollah and Israel, saying that Tehran was only repeating the demands of the Lebanese Shiite group."

If true, then it appears that Hezbollah and Iran are reaching for a life line for Hezbollah. In a way, this can be seen as a tacit admission that they over-played their hand and don't know how to get out of the mess they've created. At UPI, there is an article that more clearly outlines Israel's plan. As I've read it, I've had to change some of the assumptions that I made in my earlier post. According to this article, far from seeking the total destruction of Hezbollah, as I assumed earlier and some hawks here in the US are arguing for, Israel is actually seeking to weaken Hezbollah both politically and economically so that the Lebanese government can finally deal with it. According to the article, and in line with most analyses elsewhere, it states that

Hezbollah wants to appear as Lebanon's defender, not destroyer. Lebanon prospered in recent years. Its Gross National Product increased, income per capita climbed, tourists were coming...

Now they are seen as the root of the problem by many Lebanese. Given Israel's limited objective, if this is indeed its actual objective, then Hezbollah will likely end up weakened and demoralized. This however, hinges on the manner in which this crisis is ultimately resolved.

Olmert seems to grasp this completely. The article states as follows

"When I hear in the morning what happens, my instinct tells me to crush them," Olmert told his ministers. However he knew "The fighting will end with political moves in partnership with other friendly countries." The Lebanese government will be the platform for a solution and that is why Israel is not fighting Prime Minister Fouad Siniora nor the Lebanese people, Olmert said. Military analysts believe the Lebanese government would need international help to assert its authority and deploy its army along the border. "Siniora himself can't do it. He needs help from friends," the senior military source said. Olmert seemed ready to pitch in. He decided to inform the United Nations that if that organization would act to return the kidnapped soldiers, stop the missile attacks and threat, help send the Lebanese army to the border and implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 (that calls for disbanding and disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias), Israel "would be happy" to cooperate.

This points to a recognition of how the crisis needs to end in order to give Israel what it wants; a stronger Lebanese government that can control Hezbollah, and eventually disarm it.

This seems to fit nicely with the above section on Iran's attempt to broker some agreement that safeguards Hezbollah's power before it is degraded to the point where Israel wants. Israel, it appears is close to achieving its objective, it is incumbent upon it now to ensure that it learns from Hezbollah's mistake and doesn't overplay its hand. Without the current pro-American Lebanese government, it will be harder for Israel to achieve the totality of its objective.

Already, Israel is looking for this diplomatic solution, the next few days should tell us more about the damage Israel has caused Hezbollah, militarily, politically and in standing among the Lebanese population, particularly the Shiite south. If Israel can also get Hezbollah, to hand over its soldiers without any additional guarantees, then the blow to Hezbollah's prestige will be even wider. For now, all we can do is to continue watching events as they unfold.

In the interim, the UN along with the world powers are taking a very good step to achieving this objective, and giving Israel the barrier it needs with Hezbollah. Currently, there are talks in the UN about expanding UN force in Lebanon. As opposed to the current force, which if anything, serves merely as decoration, the new force that is being proposed is one with teeth, and the wherewithal to take on Hezbollah. It remains to be seen what type of force the UN and the G8 members can come up with. After all, we had a similar force in place there in the 1980's and ended up loosing almost 200 US marines and 50+ French troops to terrorist attacks perpetrated by Iranian backed groups. There is much to take into account, before proceeding, but at least some ideas are starting to flow.

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Mapping a more peaceful Middle East

At least this seems to be the objective which Ralph Peters has set out to do. Given the current situation in the Middle East, I thought this article would interest a lot of people.

The main thesis presented by Peters in that the borders demarcated by the colonial powers are at the root of the problems we are encountering.

The current human divisions and forced unions between Ankara and Karachi, taken together with the region's self-inflicted woes, form as perfect a breeding ground for religious extremism, a culture of blame and the recruitment of terrorists as anyone could design. Where men and women look ruefully at their borders, they look enthusiastically for enemies.

As such, Peters proposes that we begin to think about a way to re-draw these to address the larger problems attendant we are encountering in the region.

Among these, he argues, is the injustice perpetrated against the Kurds, who are the largest minority in the world without a state of their own. Below is how Peters wants to go about things.

Begin with the border issue most sensitive to American readers: For Israel to have any hope of living in reasonable peace with its neighbors, it will have to return to its pre-1967 borders — with essential local adjustments for legitimate security concerns. But the issue of the territories surrounding Jerusalem, a city stained with thousands of years of blood, may prove intractable beyond our lifetimes.

The most glaring injustice in the notoriously unjust lands between the Balkan Mountains and the Himalayas is the absence of an independent Kurdish state. There are between 27 million and 36 million Kurds living in contiguous regions in the Middle East (the figures are imprecise because no state has ever allowed an honest census). Greater than the population of present-day Iraq, even the lower figure makes the Kurds the world's largest ethnic group without a state of its own. Worse, Kurds have been oppressed by every government controlling the hills and mountains where they've lived since Xenophon's day.

Peters points out, that one of the main benefits of recarving borders in this manner would be that "[a] Free Kurdistan, stretching from Diyarbakir through Tabriz, would be the most pro-Western state between Bulgaria and Japan." He continues,

A just alignment in the region would leave Iraq's three Sunni-majority provinces as a truncated state that might eventually choose to unify with a Syria that loses its littoral to a Mediterranean-oriented Greater Lebanon: Phoenecia reborn. The Shia south of old Iraq would form the basis of an Arab Shia State rimming much of the Persian Gulf. Jordan would retain its current territory, with some southward expansion at Saudi expense. For its part, the unnatural state of Saudi Arabia would suffer as great a dismantling as Pakistan.

A root cause of the broad stagnation in the Muslim world is the Saudi royal family's treatment of Mecca and Medina as their fiefdom. With Islam's holiest shrines under the police-state control of one of the world's most bigoted and oppressive regimes — a regime that commands vast, unearned oil wealth — the Saudis have been able to project their Wahhabi vision of a disciplinarian, intolerant faith far beyond their borders.

imagine how much healthier the Muslim world might become were Mecca and Medina ruled by a rotating council representative of the world's major Muslim schools and movements in an Islamic Sacred State — a sort of Muslim super-Vatican — where the future of a great faith might be debated rather than merely decreed. True justice — which we might not like — would also give Saudi Arabia's coastal oil fields to the Shia Arabs who populate that subregion, while a southeastern quadrant would go to Yemen. Confined to a rump Saudi Homelands Independent Territory around Riyadh, the House of Saud would be capable of far less mischief toward Islam and the world.

Iran, a state with madcap boundaries, would lose a great deal of territory to Unified Azerbaijan, Free Kurdistan, the Arab Shia State and Free Baluchistan, but would gain the provinces around Herat in today's Afghanistan — a region with a historical and linguistic affinity for Persia. Iran would, in effect, become an ethnic Persian state again, with the most difficult question being whether or not it should keep the port of Bandar Abbas or surrender it to the Arab Shia State.

What Afghanistan would lose to Persia in the west, it would gain in the east, as Pakistan's Northwest Frontier tribes would be reunited with their Afghan brethren (the point of this exercise is not to draw maps as we would like them but as local populations would prefer them). Pakistan, another unnatural state, would also lose its Baluch territory to Free Baluchistan. The remaining "natural" Pakistan would lie entirely east of the Indus, except for a westward spur near Karachi.

Peter's theory, is to say the least radical. He understands this and tries to provide arguments that can justify it, however, the larger question is whether this project can be achieved barring an all out war in the Muslim world, between the West, its allies in the region, and our enemies there where our victory allow us to impose our will, these new borders or something close to them, on the players in the region.

It seems like a tall order, as most countries, particularly those who stand to loose a lot like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, would be to say the least, unenthusiastic about this prospect. That said, it is an interesting theory, particularly with regard to turning Mecca and Medina into a Super-Vatican for Islam where all the branches of Islam can debate the religion rather than just have one very intransigent interpretation (such as wahhabism) imposing its will.

There is another question that must also be addressed. Mainly, is Peters' thesis correct, will changing the borders of the Middle East address the Global Salafi Jihadist insurgency we are currently dealing with? That is, will changing borders address the grievances, and ideology behind the movement? How can we ensure that such a drastic realignment brings to power governments with the ability to exert authority within their own states and so prevent terrorist networks from setting up shop and taking advantage of the probable power vacuum in the region once the borders are redrawn?

In Peters defense, it does not seem as if he is advocating our doing this at whim, but rather as a process that will take years to achieve as wars and crises surface in the region. In other words, his argument is to shape the strategic environment to bring about such change on its own rather than have it imposed on the populations of the Middle East.

Given that this will likely take years to do, not to mention treasure and blood, is such a program feasible given our inability to handle regime change in Iraq?

In any case, given what is going on in the region I thought I would put this out there and see if anyone had any ideas or comments regarding Peters' proposition.

Below are the two maps provided by Peters. The first is his before map or how the Muslim world looks now, while the second is his after map or how the Muslim world will look after his proposed changes.

Thoughts, comments?

Before:

After:

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Thoughts on the current Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese conflict

We are 23 days into the current crisis (I'm counting from the abduction of Corporal Shalit by Hamas on June 25), and it is unclear where this will all end. The crisis has elicited strong responses from everyone, from President Bush, to President Putin to the Saudi Royal Family to bloggers. There is much bluster about the current situation, with people on both sides making assertions as to what is happening and the likely implications it will have for the United States. In this sort of atmosphere, I hesitate to throw my hat into this tumult but given the importance of the current situation and the implications it will have on the GWOT, I will do just that.

First, I want to begin by identifying those things that we know to have happened that likely precipitated the current crisis and work from there to a broader strategic perspective that would shine light on the larger issues at play in the crisis and how they affect our GWOT and our confrontation with Iran.

Hamas-Fatah Agreement

On June 28 many newspapers reported that Hamas and Fatah had reached "a tentative agreement...on a common political platform that could lead to negotiations with Israel." The highlights of said agreement included Hamas' acceptance of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, which many observers argued implicitly accepted the existence of the Israeli state. In addition, the agreement also recognized the primacy of the PLO and Abbas in negotiating with Israel. While there were many points of contention, and the agreement fell short of the demands of Israel and the Quartet, it was a move in the positive direction. On the same day as Western newspapers were reporting the agreement, Hamas attacked an Israeli checkpoint killing all of its soldiers, except one, Corporal Shalit whom it kidnapped to exchange for Palestinian militants in Israeli jails. In addition to this action, members of Hamas also began firing rockets into Israeli territory

This action prompted a strong Israeli response which included sending in Israeli forces into Gaza to not only rescue Corporal Shalit, but also to punish Hamas for its actions. At first glance, this looks like just another example of why Israel should never have trusted Palestinians to keep their word to maintain the ceasefire brokered by Mahmud Abbas. It provides one more example of why appeasement never works, or so many right-wing bloggers have argued. Leaving that aside for the minute, however, I want to ask a different question, given that Fatah and Hezbollah had already come up with an agreement that opened the path to negotiations with Israel, why then did Hamas choose to carry out this operation? According to most news reports, and experts on the issue, there is a split in the leadership of Hamas between the exiled leadership in Lebanon and the leadership in the Palestinian territories. According to this theory, the Hamas leadership in the Palestinian territories wants to negotiate with Israel and to take a more moderate line that would ease sanctions against their government so that they can begin addressing the problems of the Palestinian people. The Hamas leadership in exile, however, is taking a harder line against negotiations with Israel. Led by Khaled Masha